"The Khan is dead, long live the Khan!" Is Kazakhstan preparing Nazarbayev's succession?

Kazakhstan, the first economic power in Central Asia, who possesses important deposits of uranium, oil, gas and other raw materials is usually described as the most stable state in the region. Despite president Nazarbayev's authoritarianism, the country even assumed chairmanship of he OESC this year. However, the relative calm of the Kazakh steppe has recently been troubled by a series of corruption cases that already sent officials behind bars.

Last summer, the Kazakh parliament supported a bill that, though it has not been signed by the president, made him "leader of the nation", which would allow him to maintain some political powers even after retiring. This led some to believe that Nursultan Nazarbayev was planning to retire. However, in September, president Nazarbayev declared he intended to run for the next presidential election, in a move to stop what is increasingly looking like a succession struggle.

The earlier mentioned series of judicial cases started in late Febuary 2010, when the former deputy defense minister was arrested on charge that he made suspicious deals with an Israeli armament company. In mid-March, Mokhtar Dzhakishev, former Kazatomprom chairman, was also accused of hijacking company property up to 800.000 USD value. Some think that this is due to his links with Mokhtar Ablyazov, a fallen oligarch sentenced to six years in prison in 2002 whose pardon he secured in 2003. Ablyazov, today residing in London, was again charged shortly after creating an advocating organization to promote democracy and accountability in Kazakhstan. By the way, he was  charged in the first place after accusing Timur Kulibayev, one of Nazarbayev's son-in-law, of taking bribes during a financial operation between Kazakh and Chinese energy companies. Dzhakishev, who led the transformation of Kazatomprom into a world-leading uranium producer, seems to be paying for the guarantee he gave on behalf of Ablyazov.

August was marked by yet another noticeable event. Nabil Shayakhmetov, head of the National Security Committee (KNB), then considered as a close confident to the Kazakh president, was replaced by Nurtay Abikayev, belonging to the president's so-called "old guard". This switch in position occurred while rumors circulated about an aborted coup d'etat allegedly fomented by several officials of the KNB, who themselves were said to act under orders of a "southerner's" clan seeking to take power.

Finally, in early September, the minister of health was also arrested on charges of appropriating public property for his personal benefit. However, lower ranks of the administration are also concerned, as mani mid-level officials have also fallen due to this campaign.

Nursultan Nazarbayev seems decided to stay in power "as long as his country needs him". Aged 70, the Kazakh president seems mentally and physically healthy, which indicates that he could stay in power for some more years. Besides, the country's economic performances (although the benefits of such growth essentially benefit to networks related to the president) and a growing cult of personality secured widespread popular support for the president. Finally, fear of destabilization (like in neighboring Kyrgyzstan) also prompts Kazakhs to rally around their president. However, Nazarbayev's staying in power could not be sufficient to avoid a power struggle between the clans vying for power.

First of all, the Kazakh president did not appoint a successor, and clans will be competing for succession until he does so. Besides, the president's "old guard" is getting increasingly older, and death is now increasingly possible for the elders of the presidential staff, as Vladimir Ni's death this September has shown. Younger officials belonging to opposite clans will certainly compete for such vacant seats, a prospect that is today the only threat to Kazakhstan's stability.

Tajikistan headed towards a civil war?

Last September 19th, an ambush lain in the gorge of Kamarob resulted in the death  of 28 Tajik soldiers (according to official sources). A group linked to Al-Qaeda later endorsed responsibility for the attacks. This gorge is located in the Rasht Valley region, in center Tajikistan, and was a well-known stronghold of the islamic guerrillas during the 92-97 civil war. Some official sources also stated that foreign fighters took part in the ambush. This bloody skirmish follows several earlier attacks and may be the sign of  deteriorating security in the country, which explains why they are taken very seriously by Tajik authorities. Those have already launched a large sweeping operation targeting the rebels that took part to the attacks, while an earlier statement (August 2nd) by the commander in chief of the Russian airborne troops lets us think that Moscow is closely watching the situation.

Tajikistan on the verge of yet another civil war?

Deteriorating security is nothing new nor surprising in Tajikistan. In 2009 already, they were concerns about djihadist fighters fleeing the Pakistani offensive and seeking refuge in Northern Afghanistan and in neighboring regions. It was thought in particular that fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had fought alongside the Taleban in 2001 and used Tajikistan to launch attacks in Uzbekistan, had returned to their former sanctuaries.

These fears came true on August 23rd 2010, when several inmates (most of them non-tajik) escaped from a high-security compound. Two weeks later, a suicide bombing targeted a militia office in Khodjent, later to be followed by another bombing against a nightclub in Dushanbe on September 6th. Finally, tajik security forces reported skirmishes with Taleban fighters in border areas on September 11th, an incident that was followed by the September 19th ambush.

Though Taleban insurgents from Afghanistan are a threat to Tajikistan's security, they are nothing more that a potential catalyzer for other risks against the country's stability. Indeed, since the end of the civil war in 1997, increasing political repression, inefficiency of a corruption-ridden state and a series of catastrophes made the country more and more unstable.

From the 1997 peace settlement to today's events: a balance more than ambivalent.

The 1997 peace agreement ended the civil war in Tajikistan between the former communist elite from the western parts of the country (Khujand and Kulyab regions) and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), dominated by easterners(Garm and Gorno-Badakshan regions) and in which the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) played important political and military roles. It thus became the first (an only) Islamic political party to be tolerated by authorities in Central Asia, and to be allow to run for election. However, since then, President Emomali Rakhmonov constantly struggled to marginalize the opposition, which has almost disappeared from parliament. Furthermore, the State is now hunting down former opposition combatants (that have since then abandoned the armed struggled or have joined the official security forces) under cover of counter-narcotics operations. Finally, as in the rest of Central Asia, the repression against the Hizb-ut-Tahrir may result into parts of its members (most of them ethnic Uzbeks) to abandon this extremist yet nonviolent movement to engage in armed struggle.

Not only has the State engaged into a policy of systematic political crackdown ; it is also deeply corrupt. In particular, the efficiency and impartiality of the security forces are greatly hampered by widespread nepotism (loyalty to President Rakhmonov's clan more than skill and competence are the key to advancement). The same goes with the judiciary system, thought to be corrupt and inefficient by the local population, which increasingly turns to sharia law and mediation by clergymen to settle usual and civil conflicts like divorce. Finally, politicians and officials tend to use their position to make their personal business prosper. For example, a mysterious company, registered in the British Virgin Islands whose ownership remains undisclosed recently installed tooboothes along the Dushanbe-Khodjent road (which links the capital to the country's second city, located in the Ferghana Valley). Inhabitants and traders crossing the region have to pay a quite important sum every time they pass, which tends to exasperate them. And most of them think that those who allowed the company to collect tolls on the road are the very same in whose pockets the money finally ends...

Finally, external or uncontrolled events such as power shortages (due to tensions with Uzbekistan and poor maintenance of the power distribution system), droughts, poor harvests and the world economic crisis do nothing to improve the situation. The crisis is particularly impacting those countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, heavily dependent on remittances by expat workers, whose capabilities for money transfer have shrunk. Growing insurgent activity in northern Afghanistan and the progressive criminalization of the society due to increased drug trafficking in the country also tend to have negative effects in the field of stability...

NATO, China and Russia facing a spilling-over Afghan chaos

The accumulation of all those elements is not concern-free, especially given the arrival of battle hardened Islamic guerrillas in the area. Indeed, poor quality tajik troops are not a challenge to Islamic fighters that, although they are not always familiar to the area (most veterans of the Civil War are simply too old to fight), are hardened by years of combat against NATO and Pakistani troops. There is also a real risk that the population, impoverished by the crisis and exasperated by the corruption of its leaders, turns to Islamic insurgents or drug traffickers, for financial or ideological reasons. In particular, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which is ideologically close to the IMU, is very popular among Uzbeks, which makes this group particularly vulnerable to infiltration by islamic insurgents (one must remember that the IMU was formed by Uzbek islamic guerrillas that had already taken part to the Civil War). Thus, it would not be extraordinary to see local Islamic movements taking advantage of popular support and experience transfer from afghan rebels to become a deadly foe.

While Kyrgyzstan's stability is already greatly compromised, increased unrest in Tajikistan is the last thing the different actors with interests in the area need. NATO, for its part, has no need to see the Northern Distribution Network endangered by Islamic insurgents outside Afghanistan. China, for its part, cannot stay idle while chaos in Tajikistan threatens the stability of its own restless Sin-Kiang province. Finally, Russia, by far the most deeply concerned power in the region, cannot permit Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to slide into anarchy. By doing so, it would allow drug traffickers to operate freely from the Afghan border to the boundaries of Kazakhstan, which is to enter in a customs union with Russia by 2011. And the last thing Russia needs is tons of heroin arriving undisturbed to its border, while it already has huge problems with drug addiction among its population.

Kyrgyzstan on the verge of a critical vote

Electoral poster, Kyrgyzstan.

Credits: ferghana.ru

Notwithstanding the chaos in which it has sunk since the ouster of president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan is now headed towards elections, due for this year's 10th of October. No less than 29 parties will be in competition for the 120 seats of the new legislature. Though this kind of consultation is often seen as a way to unblock a stranded political situation, especially after the type of unrest the country has gone through, in this case it could further destabilize Kyrgyzstan.

A deeply shattered country

The number of parties competing for seats and the poverty of their respective political programs can be explained, among other things, by the fact that some are mere tools for the advancement of an individual's or a clan's interests. An official post generally enables access to public resources that allow to protect or develop more or less legal businesses. In the present case, a seat in parliament also means immunity from judiciary pursuits, something bound to interest some local crime bosses eager to retain some freedom of action to conduct their business.

Among the parties officially registered for the upcoming election, Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) has drawn the attention of several observers. This party gathers many officials and followers of the fallen president, and makes up for the lack of relevance of its political program by mobilizing Kyrgyz from the southern regions through harsh nationalistic statements and stances, firm rejection of the provisional government's legitimacy, and refusal of foreign intervention (especially by the OSCE) in the country's inner affairs. It is led by Kashymbek Tashiev, Bakiyev's former minister of emergency situations, who became known after declaring that the Kyrgyz did not get the respect they deserve in their own state, and that Kyrgyzstan's ethnic minorities had to be culturally assimilated to prevent future ethnic unrest. 

The mayor of Osh, Melyzbek Myrzakmatov, among Bakiev's close followers, illustrates this strongly anti-government stance. Named by the former president, he successfully resisted attempts by the provisional government to have him to step down. He makes no mystery of his refusal to abide by Bishkek's rulings ("Provisional government directives have no legal force in the South"), and has launched an urban policy that some equate to ethnic cleansing. He has indeed announced the construction of collective housings in Osh's Uzbek districts that were destroyed in June, officially to house both Uzbek and Kyrgyz, but few doubt that only Kyrgyz will move in.

Roots of evil: the lingering heritage of the USSR's politics of nationalities.

Kyrgyzstan is a soviet-engineered country, that dates back to the early days of the USSR's politics of nationalities, at the time under the responsibility of the People's commissar for nationalities, Joseph Stalin. This policy advocated the creation of national republics along ethnic principles ("one people, on language, one territory"), though it had to be tempered so that the new republics could enjoy a minimum viability, hence the inclusion of parts of the Uzbek-populated Ferghana Valley into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In soviet times,  Moscow's control allowed ethnic conflicts between local Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Kyrgyz, and immigrants (whether Europeans or deported populations from the Caucasus or the Volga Basin) to remain frozen. However, the situation worsened after the implosion of the USRR. Relations between communities have since then gradually deteriorated.

Latent tensions that existed in Kyrgyzstan since the early 1990's brutally surfaced this summer. They first took the form of land occupation and property destructions, essentially at the expanse of ethnic minorities (Uzbeks and Meshketians Turks). Then, the bloody June riots in Osh, that heavily affected Uzbeks, shattered for good an already fragile inter-community trust, even though it is now likely that the riots were organized and that many Kyrgyz assisted and protected their Uzbek neighbours. Today, tensions result in occasional clashes and reciprocal mistrust. 

More intense in the South, anti-Uzbek feelings are particularly strong among the youth, which proved to be less influenced by calls to reconciliation. Additionaly, deep tensions continue to exist between Kyrgyz in the North and those in the South, traditionally poorer and kept away from power (except of course during the Bakiev era). The gap is today so deep that some even consider a partition of the country in two States regrouped in a federation. 

Towards the engulfment of the Ferghana Valley?

The October elections are a high risk vote. Numerous opposition parties indeed have youth sections that occasionaly serve as shock squads. If the result came to be contested, they could be used to spread disorder. This would certainly increase the Norsth-South gap, something that reminds us of the early days of the civil war in neighbouring Tajikistan. Furthermore, continuing persecutions against Uzbeks could result in some of them resorting to violence, whether by setting up paramilitary groups, or by turning to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan for assistance. The IMU would certainly accept, since a Kyrgyz sanctuary would be a key asset in its crusade to spread havoc in the entire Ferghana Valley. Furthermore, numerous Uzbek diasporas exist, including in Saudi Arabia, rich and influential enough to provide assistance regarding this domain.

One has to hope that calls to ethnic clash by nationalistic parties remain without widespread effect among the Kyrgyz, and/or that the fear of Moscow's reaction should the country fall into anarchy deter extremist elements to take active measures. The provisional government's call for amnesty of corrupted official (should they return the sums they took) provides a glimmer of hope for the upcoming post-elections period.

A "Peace Canal" for Central Asia?

While fires were restarting in Russia, an important summit on cross-border cooperation gathered in Ust-Kamenogorsk, last 7th September, Russian and Kazakh presidents. On this occasion, kazakh head of state Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested to resurrect one of the pharaonic projects of the defunct USSR. Abandonned during the Perestroïka, this project advocated for the diversion of part of the siberian rivers that end up in the Arctic Ocean to the South.

President Dmitri Medvedev, though he did not discard any possibility, stated that he favoured the restoration of Central Asia's soviet-inherited water infrastructures, who suffered a great deal of damage due to lack of maintenance. Also, a more consensual management of the region's water resources, which is today hampered by lingering border conflicts between the States that succeeded the Soviet Union, would help tackle the lack of water.

Prometheus in Siberia: genesis of an aborted project

Preparatory studies begun by injunction of the Central Committee in 1968. The project itself was to be divided into a western part, covering European territories of the USSR, and an eastern part in Southern Siberia and Central Asia, aimed at balancing water distribution in the Soviet Union.

In the West, it was planned to transfer about 19 km3 from Lake Onega and several rivers of Western Siberia to the Volga and Kama rivers yearly. This diversion was by far the less problematic part of the project. Its cost was, in 1982, estimated to 4 billion dollars.

The diversion of the rivers in Central Siberia (actually, 7% of the annual stream were to be diverted) was however far more problematic. During the first phase of the project, 27 km3 were to be withdrawn yearly from the Ob and Irytsh rivers. A 2500 km long canal leaving from the junction of the two rivers would have carried the waters into the Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria. Because of seasonal differences in the river flow, water was to be withdrawn from the Ob and lower Irytsh between and April, and from the middle and upper Irytsh the rest of the time. The project had a planned cost of 53 billion dollars, which included the construction of irrigation and water distribution facilities. During the second phase of the project, the volume of water diverted was to reach 60 km3 a year through increased pumping capacities and canal size.

The cost of this program was partly due to the numerous technical obstacles it had to overcome. Indeed, because it was necessary to revert the course of the lower Irytsh, numerous dams and pumping stations would have been necessary to transfer water to a reservoir near Tobolsk, and from there to the Sibaral canal. However, in spite of this, the project was nonetheless seriously considered. By diverting waters otherwise lost in the Arctic Ocean and in the empty regions of Northern Siberia, it would have permitted to reduce water shortages in Southern Siberia and Central Asia. These heavily populated regions also have soils suitable for agriculture, which an additional input of water would have permitted to irrigate more widely (sources state that the project would have permitted to irrigate 4 million hectares). Furthermore, additional water supply would have contributed to restore the hydraulic balance in the Aral sea region, whose fate is now widely known. Indeed, this inland sea depends on the Amu-Daria and the Syr-Daria for its water supply, two rivers that were already heavily diverted for the needs of cotton cultivation

Map of the Sibaral canal

Credits:  http://www.schiffundtechnik.com 

 This project, however, rapidly drew strong criticism and started a debate whose lenght and intensity were unusual in pre-glasnost USSR. Apart for financial costs, that were deemed under-valued or impossible to compensate in a reasonable time, the critics put forward numerous technical and ecological arguments. First of all, massive water transfer were threatening fishing activities on the Ob river, and Northern Siberia's marshes with drying out. This would have increased risks of wildfires and threatened oil and gas exploitation in the region. Besides, 25 to 50% of the water transferred would have been lost due to infiltration and evaporation not even to mention the amount of energy necessary to power the pumping facilities reverting the course of the Irytsh. Finally, massive water transfer alone cannot solve Central Asia's water scarcity problem. A more efficient use of local water resources would allow to reduce water stress through water savings. In this respect, several irrigation methods used in Turkestan, Iran and Afghanistan for centuries could usefully inspire today's engineers.

With the beggining of the glasnost, this debate was one of the first to go public (ecology was one of the first topic to be open to free discussion). The project was officially dropped in 1986, and was perceived as the first victory of the "civil society" against a deaf bureaucracy clearly more attached to its prerogatives and subsidies than to the public interest.

Current implications of the project

It is no wonder that the initiative to resurrect the Sibaral came from a head of state from Central Asia. Back in Soviet times, the project was widely backed by the region's apparatchiki and administrations. The Russians are more divided on this matter. Environmentalist experts and association are clearly opposed to a renewed "crime of the century" like the one that emptied the Aral sea. Some circles close to the Kremlin are however more favourable to the project. Yuri Lujkov, mayor of Moscow and a personal friend of Vladimir Putin, did not hide its support for the project, as did not several high-ranking officials in charge of the project back in Soviet times. For him, the project would allow increased agricultural and economic activity, thus contributing to fight unstability, islamic radicalism and terrorism in Central Asia. More important, the republics bordering the Aral sea (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) would face increased dependency to Moscow. Finally, more water in Southern Siberia would also mean less risk of wildfires.

Such a project carries numerous political opportunities for Russia in the former Soviet territories. However, its cost could block it from even being started, since Russia is not in a position to fund it alone. However, China, which is already involved in the development of hydraulic power in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, could back this project, which reminds of its own project to divert the Yangtze river, with funds and expertise. Water imports from Russia to Central Asia would partly solve the problems posed by its own energy projects in the Tian Shan, which could then continue without risk of generating grave regional tensions.

Whatever, one could hardly fail to remain the Kazakh president that some maintenance and upgrade works on the existing systems would be a more money-saving good start, that would besides help prevent some catastrophes... 

 Credits: Libération

China's river grab on the "Roof of the World"

While Russia is being engulfed by wildfires, Asia has to struggle with massive flooding. Afghanistan, Pakistan and China are indeed hit, to various degrees, by destructive floods resulting from important rainfall. In China, these have been so important that the authorities had to open the Three Gorges dam (which was, quite ironically, constructed to prevent such floods on the Yangtze). In the wake of such extreme and unpredictable climate events, the Chinese government might be prompted to accelerate its dam construction projects.

Dams and hydro-power plants have numerous advantages for China. They make it possible to regulate the course of important rivers to prevent or reduce flooding, while producing China's much needed energy with few pollution or greenhouse gas emission. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has launched numerous construction projects, which already triggered conflicts with neighboring states. In particular, Chinese interference with the Mekong's natural course has angered southeastern Asian states and populations, deprived of the waters and fishes they need for their living. Recently, Chinese engineers started considering building a dam on the Brahmaputra river in Tibet, which is causing unrest in India and Bangladesh.

From black to blue gold: prospect for the development of hydraulic power in Central Asia

Central Asia's fossil fuel deposits were already known to attract Chinese attention, but less was known about the PRC's interests for the region's hydro-electric potential. China has indeed demonstrated its will to get involved in several projects in this domain, preferably where few or no Russian companies are present in order not to alienate Moscow.

Chinese eagerness to import hydro-generated electricity couldn't come better for the region's two main potential producers, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose situation is far from perfect. After the collapse of the USSR, newly-formed states couldn't agree on river management mechanisms, which led to lingering tensions and mistrust for the last 20 years. Furthermore, in spite of their hydroelectric potential, these States have to face widespread power shortages, particularly feared during the region's harsh winters. Besides, poorly maintained and insufficient power lines result in massive energy losses during transfers. The network's configuration, which dates back to the soviet period, also makes distribution harder since several cross-border power grids usually coexist on the territory of one single state. Also, the number of water-powered plants could be far greater than what is currently built. Finally, last but not least, the dams constructed during the soviet period were less oriented towards the production of electricity for the region than the provision of water for cotton cultivation in the lowlands crossed by the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya.

Towards an integration of Asian power grids?
 

In order to break the vicious circle and to become net power exporters, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have to modernize and develop their power grids, as well as to build new power plants. This requires funds that most international donors have so far refused to give, since most important projects were factors of tension with Uzbekistan, that feared new dams would endanger its water supply and lower its leverage on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China, a neighboring country thirsty for energy, with huge amounts of money to invest and not deterred by the polemic nature of the projects, could not come better for those two States.

In Tajikistan, Chinese-backed projects are concentrated on the Zerafshan river. The Chinese Development Bank offered an important loan for the construction by SinHydro of a power plant in Yavan. In parallel, China has shown interest for the construction of a north-south high-voltage power line unifying Tajikistan's power grid and allowing future energy exports to neighboring countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Finally, China could also take part to the construction of the Rogun I & II power plants on the Vakhsh, which flows into the Amu-Darya.

Kyrgyzstan, at least until this year's civil unrest, was on China's top priority list. Indeed, a mere 10% of the country's potential is currently exploited, and it has already demonstrated willingness to collaborate with Beijing. China could thus invest large sums in the construction of the Kambarata I & II power plants on the Naryn (which flows into the Syr Darya) and of power lines stretching from Kyrgyzstan to China, and from then to Pakistan. In exchange, Kyrgyzstan would guarantee a steady power supply to China's far-western region of Sin Kiang. Finally, other options are being studied for building dams on rivers flowing from the Tian Shan mountains to China, which would besides reduce the cost of exploitation of mines located not far from there.

China is moving forward in Central Asia, in the energy sector as well as in other areas, progressively supplanting the Russian ally, who cannot compete with Beijing when it comes to economy. Increased Chinese presence could have positive consequences, should Beijing choose to buy power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in summer. This would allow these two countries to release waters to be used by Uzbekistan's agriculture, easing the tensions with the latter's, while accumulating hard currency to be later used to buy energy during winter. However, should China buy energy in winter, this would likely increase border tensions with Uzbekistan. And the way China has so far managed cross-border water issues does not encourage to think that Beijing will seek a consensus...

Map of the Central Asian power grid.

Credits: www.geni.org

Отпуск...

... or, for those not speaking Russian, I'm taking a one-month break, between Paris and Eurasia. Blogging is likely to be minimal these days and should resume normally by the end of July.

Unstability in Kirgyzstan : prelude to a civil war or mere riots?

The situation in South Kirghizstan is currently a source of concern to many. Troubles already left over 100 dead, about 1.500 wounded and triggered a mass exodus of ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan (official sources set the toll to about 80.000 displaced people, but unofficial sources released much higher figures ranging from 200.000 to 300.000). In order to quell the unrest, the Kirghiz provisional government has officially asked Russian troops to be deployed (somethning still refused by Moscow). However, should the government fail to stabilize the situation in the country, the issue of foreign intervention (and more especially of Russian military intervention) would come up again on the table.

Old hatreds, unusual unrest

Osh has been for some times the theatre of bloody ethnic riots mainly directed against the Uzbek population of the city. Many Uzbek already fled the country, while those still in the city barricaded so to avoid death by the hand of thugs, shunning any movement even to seek medical care or provisions. Several fires have reportedly been started by armed bands, which prevent firemen access to the sites.

It is today evident that the riots were started by elements linked to the criminal world, quite powerful in the area and taking advantage of political instability to settle scores. The assassination of an important crime boss, Aybek Mirsidikov (a.k.a "Black Aybek") is reported to have started the ongoing surge in criminal activity. However, it is thought that "external" forces are actually using criminal organizations as "contractors" to pursue their own goals. This reminds us of land property seizures that occurred following the ousting of president Bakiyev, some of them being carried out by fairly organized groups with violence. Today, it seems that the goal of those behind the resurgence in ethnic tensions and riots is to prevent the constitutional referendum planned later this month from taking place smoothly.

Tensions between Uzbek and Kyrgyz always existed in the Ferghana Valley, although they seldom triggered full fledged ethnic fighting (except in 1990), are deeply rooted. Several elements still fuel tensions between communities. First of all, alleged discrimination against the Uzbek in the administration, elected bodies and  regarding population statistics are regularly put forward. Also, numerous Uzbek businessmen complain about racket by corrupted officials from a mainly Kirghiz bureaucracy. Finally, the issue of land, already evoked in an earlier article, also plays its part.

The fightings also had consequences in matters not directly linked to security. Due to unrest, supply of essential goods and services to the city has been brought to a halt for several days already, which led to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation there as well as to scarcity of food and water. Outside of Osh, mass exodus of ethnic Uzbek in neighbouring Uzbekistan is putting an additional stress on the already crowed (and unstable) Ferghana Valley.

Attempts by the police to quell the unrest have so far proved unsuccessful, mainly because it lacks number and adequate equipment. In order to reverse the course of events and restore order, the provisional government initiated a partial mobilization of the army and sent additional police forces in the South. Additionally, it has called for Russian intervention in the country to support the government, while non governmental organization called for the UN to intervene militarily to halt the fightings.

Kyrgyz forces patrolling the streets of Osh

(Credits: REUTERS/lemonde.fr)

Are we headed towards a Russian direct involvement?

Neighbouring countries and influential powers with interests in the region have so far refused to get involved directly, rather sending medical and humanitarian assistance. While Russia and the CSTO have refused to send armed support, it is unlikely that the US and NATO will further stretch a military apparatus already to its limits with a stability operation in Southern Afghanistan proving more challenging than initially planned. The SCO, which gathered on the 11th of June in a summit in Tashkent, for its part made no sign that it was ready to commit itself actively.

However, direct foreign military intervention cannot be discarded, should the provisional government be unable to restore order. Indeed, many neighbouring states cannot permit unrest to settle in. Uzbekistan is both concerned with Islamic radicals (and especially IMO militants) taking refuge in this region and ethnic Uzbek refugees flooding in from Kirghiz Ferghana. Neither can the US and NATO countries engaged in Afghanistan allow such a situation to develop near supply lines vital to their campaign in Afghanistan. China, on its side, is not ready to accept a grey zone where Uigur Islamic militants could one day take refuge. Finally, Russia cannot allow this part of what is still its backyard slide into anarchy.

Being the heir to the defunct USSR, Russia remains the main security provider for the States of the region, a role it has so far defended against its Chinese "partner", with whom competition on the economic field is impossible. By refusing (or being unable) to rescue an ally requesting assistance would send a very negative signal and prompt other powers to take Russia's place in the area. China could seize the opportunity to become the new security provider, while Uzbekistan may chose to intervene in an attempt to stop the persecutions and the uncontrolled flow of refugees.

Thus, it appears that Russia has not formally discarded military intervention, while it reinforced its troops in the country. Moscow is however likely to shun as much as possible any further risky military operation, given its experiences in Chechnya and Afghanistan. It will rather wait for threats of direct involvement and tougher actions taken by the Kirghiz interim government to give effects before moving in, preferably with strong multilateral legitimation by CSTO or even SCO. Yet the prospect for such a scenario might well vanish, as reports of riots turning into mere looting of abandoned buildings and businesses started to come from Osh recently.

 Frontier guards of Uzbekistan helping ethnic Uzbek to flee Kyrgyzstan

(Credits: www.eurasianet.org)

Opium: "poison de rêve" and Russia's nightmare

As to answer NATO's ongoing offensive in Southern Afghanistan, an international forum dedicated to the issue of Afghan narcotics started in Moscow yesterday. A few days earlier, Russia's defence minister made clear the Kremlin's disappointment regarding what it considers as insufficient efforts by NATO forces to fight poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The question is of paramount importance to Russia, far more than to most NATO countries.

Narcotics in Central Asia; from local use to global trade

Climate in many regions of Central Asia and Afghanistan perfectly suits cultivation of crops such as hashish, poppy or ephedra, which serve as raw materials for several psycho-active substances. Logically, the locals quickly learned to use these plants for relaxation or medicinal purposes (one can think of the use made of opium as a painkiller in Joseph Kessel's Horsemen).

 Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and, to some extent, Central Asia (under soviet rule till recently) did not quickly increase before 1979 and the beginning of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. This growth is due to the conflict itself (the mujaheddin used opium as a source of income to fund their jihad) and to measures of interdiction taken in several countries (Turkey, Pakistan to some extent and Iran after the Islamic Revolution). Following the Soviet withdrawal and the expansion of the civil war, poppy cultivation further increased. Indeed, since US aid had stopped, warlords used drug trade to fund their militias, while peasants had found with opium a valuable crop in these troubled times. Finally, poppy does not require as much water as other crops to grow, and once harvested it can be kept some times; both things are important in a country where water and roads allowing fast travel to trade centres are scarce.

Genesis of a cancer

Before the arrival of Soviet troops  in Afghanistan, consumption of drugs was minimal in the USRR. However, combat stress experienced by soviet troops (most of them were reservists or draftees) led to a sharp increase in the consumption of narcotics, which created a demand inside USSR. This led to the development of drug rings involving Afghan producers and soviet smugglers, which outlived the end of the war and of the Soviet Union itself. After the collapse of the USSR, poor surveillance of the new borders and generalized impoverishment  created the conditions for large-scale drug trade to thrive. The civil war in Tajikistan further eased the development of continental smuggling rings (all parties resorted to drug trade to fund their struggle), especially due to the presence of ethnic Tajiks on both side of the Afghan-Tajik border and the widespread use of Russian as a lingua franca in former USSR. These rings still benefit from simple migration procedures between Russia and Tajikistan, as well as of the involvement of officials in drug trade (including veterans of the Tajik civil war now holding power seats). Finally, it appears that members of the Russian peacekeeping force in the country used military transports (not subject to controls) to smuggle drugs inside Russia, which prompted Moscow to tighten control over its soldiers abroad.

Because of Iran's bitter fight against drug trade, most of Afghan-made heroin now crosses Central Asia and Russia, whose borders are less tightly monitored. Complex boundaries, rampant corruption and diminishing volumes (smugglers now increasingly process poppy into heroin into Afghanistan rather than shipping raw materials outside of the country) make it harder for law enforcement units to intercept drug shipments. Eventually, transit areas become markets and Russia now has to cope with huge drug trade-related problems that impact its demography, endanger its future and fuel corruption. According to a UN paper, 30.000 Russians die every year because of heroin (one third of the 100.000 yearly toll of heroin addiction), while several millions (estimates range from 1,5 to 6 million people between 15 and 64) are heroin-addicted. Drug addiction also poses public health (HIV spreads through syringes exchanges) and socio-economic long-term problems (over-mortality of heroin-addicted youth, criminalization of the society, and economic weight of a significant population of addicts).

Roots of evil

Russia's growing concern and impatience are due to the importance of the drug trafficking problem and to its origins. Indeed, the take-off of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan occurred with the CIA's silent consent, while opium production kept on growing since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. Furthermore, the ISAF today concentrates on the fight against the insurgency, which draws profits from drug trade but is only one actor among others. Moscow especially reproaches NATO with renouncing poppy crops elimination because such policy would turn rural populations against ISAF forces. These prefer let the Afghan security forces deal with the problem, preferably by destroying labs and already processed heroin rather than burning crops. However, the Afghan National Police is plagued by corruption, and has so far not proved very efficient to tackle the problem

Moscow further denounced Washington's double standards on this issue ; while the US stress the importance not to alienate the population in Afghanistan, they long supported aggressive crops-elimination policies in Latin America, especially in Colombia. Russia also complained of poor cooperation between security forces in Afghanistan (regardless of their nationality) and Central Asian law enforcement agencies.

As a conclusion, it must be stressed that the Colombian experience in the field of counter-narcotics is worth a look and potentially interesting for upcoming operations in Afghanistan. This “Integral Action” doctrine emphasizes the need for coercion (elimination of illegal crops and dismantlement of illegal armed bands) and people-centred operations (population control and aid programs to promote alternative crops). The French armed forces' experience in Easter Afghanistan is also relevant in this domain.

Update (10.06.10): here is a potentially interesting article relased by ferghana.ru (in Russian) dedicated to drug trafficking through Kazakhstan. Let's also note that the subject of narcotics trade from Afghanistan will certainly be on the agenda of the SCO summit currently underway in Tashkent.

Tehran-Moscow axis: strategic partnership or simple "Entente Cordiale"?

The recent announcement of a Brazil-backed agreement between Turkey and Iran, regarding the latter's nuclear program has somehow driven attention away from the sharp deterioration of diplomatic relations between Russia and Iran. Judging by unfriendly official statements, the Russo-Iranian partnership did not survived Moscow's stauncher stance on the Iranian nuclear issue. Not limiting its reaction to mere words, Tehran has taken steps to improve its relationship with Georgia.

Russia's exasperation with Tehran is rooted in the latter's evident lack of goodwill on the nuclear issue. Indeed, Iran agreed to send its uranium abroad, only to withdraw its offer some days after and announce in parallel that it would proceed with enrichment to a higher degree, that was getting Tehran closer from mastering military nuclear process. Finally, active muscle-flexing from Tehran in the last months (war-games in the Gulf and repeated announcements about state-of-the-art weaponry entering service) did little to convince Moscow that Tehran's views are non-aggressive.

Moscow's concerns have been sensible for some time now. Over the past few months, Russia has been accused by Iran of delaying the entry into service of the nuclear plant in Bushehr (built by Rosatom) and of holding up the delivery of S-300 anti-aircraft systems.

Political U-turn or logical realignment?

One could assume that Moscow's new stance is the result of US concessions, of Medvedev's new attitude towards the West or simply of Russia's growing concern of Iran going nuclear. Whatever has triggered Moscow's change of attitude towards Iran, on thing is sure: given the numerous potential conflict points between Russia and Iran, their so-far rather good relationship was more a pragmatic alliance rather than a long-term strategic commitment.

Russia and Persia (whose Iran is somehow the heir) have a long story of rivalry and war, especially in the Caucasus (a fight that the Russians had largely won by the end of the XIXth century). Later on, Persia was placed in the spheres of influence of England and Russia (which was eventually replaced by the soviet union), and even occupied by Allied and Soviet forces during World War II. Finaly, the Islamic Revolution and its message of revolt to Muslims worldwide did not make Iran more friendly in the eyes of the Soviets, worried by the spread of sedition in their Muslim territories and already fighting an Islamic insurgency in neighbouring Afghanistan.

British caricature of the XIXth century, showing the Russian bear subjugating Persia.

Following the collapse of the USSR, Iran sought to break its encirclement by increasing its influence in countries of the former Soviet Union. This policy is still a reality, and Iran has been developing partnerships on various levels with several countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. It is no wonder then that Moscow sees with apprehension this intrusion of a new rival in what it still considers as its backyard. Especially when this rival has money (thanks to its soil's energy resources), and assets such as cultural, historical and linguistic proximity with these regions. Tensions are not limited to the Caucasus: indeed, Iran and Russia still have to agree on a legal status for the Caspian Sea, which would determine the way the seabed is shared.

Iran is fully aware of these dissensions with Russia. Hence, it has developed partnerships with China, a critical actor of the new "Great Game" and a relevant challenger to Russia influence in Central Asia. Iran today supplies China with part of the energy resources vital to its economic development, while China has already transferred sensitive military technologies to Iran (mainly in the field of ballistic, anti-ship and anti-air missiles).

From rivalry to conflict?

Despite real tensions between the two countries, it is unlikely that either of the two will push the confrontation to a superior level, whether this takes the form of direct armed conflict or proxy-wars. First of all, both Tehran and Moscow have common interest (the first of them being chasing NATO from Central Asia) and important contracts in the military and nuclear sector underway. But both States are also mutually deterred from taking too harsh measures against one another by what equates to a balance of terror.

Iran could, if needed, seriously destabilize the Caucasus, and particularly Russian-controlled parts of the region. The Pasdarans (Islamic Revolution Guard Corps) have accumulated extensive experience in the field of irregular warfare through support for Hezbollah, today one of the most proficient guerilla movements in the world. Indeed, Hezbollah's "know-how" in fields such as ambush tactics, handling of antitank weapons , assembly of IEDs and construction of underground shelters and bunkers could easily be used by Caucasian insurgents evolving in a mountainous environment suitable for guerilla tactics.

Such a move from Iran is however unlikely, given the fact that Russia would, in these event, retain tremendous retaliation capabilities on Iranian assets. And the way Mikhail Saakachvili's 2008 military adventure ended says more than a long speech on Moscow's determination not to let unpunished this kind of provocation...

 

Winds of change in Uzbekistan?

The most populous state in Central Asia, Uzbekistan today finds itself in an uncomfortable position. Shaken by the world economic crisis, unable to rely on oil and gas exports to replenish its foreign currency reserves, it is furthermore threatened by instability in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and numerous internal problems.

« It's the economy, stupid »

One could believe that Uzbekistan is doing quite well; it has indeed secured a 1,150 billion USD loan from the Asian Development Bank, the same amount it has so far lent to Uzbekistan from 1996. However, though all this fresh money will certainly relieve a strained budget, it was not without painful concessions from Uzbekistan, which could further provoke discontent among the population. Besides, indicators show that the economy is not doing well, and so on for Uzbekistan's budget.

In the past months, the Uzbek government seems to have taken several measures aimed at raising more funds: it has cut expenses on invalidity pensions, risen taxes on fuel and cars,  and lowered interest rates for private deposits in state-owned banks. This has occurred in parallel with an accelerated devaluation of the national currency (sum), whose « official » price is more and more overvalued regarding the sum/dollar parity on the black market. This most likely means that Uzbekistan is short on foreign currency reserves and unable to support the sum.

The fact the Uzbek government is obviously short on funds might prompt hasty explanations for some of last months' most unpleasant events. For example, widespread arrests of businessmen and oligarchs in march 2010 resulted in rumours that this was simply a way to refill the State's coffers. The same could be stated about the problems currently experienced by Zeromax, Uzbekistan largest private company and reportedly in the hands of President Karimov's daughter and ambassador to Spain, Gulnara (altough such pursuits are more likely politically, and not economically motivated). Finally, the loss by hundreds of their savings in the National Bank of Uzbekistan could eventually prompt rumours that the State is now robbing its own citizens in order to restore balance in its budget.

Growing discontent

The bad and so far deteriorating economic situation plays a big part in the growing exasperation of the population. Hardly hit by the crisis, heavy taxes, political repression and environmental problems, Uzbeks also had to cope, in the last months, with unpaid wages, looming food shortages, as well as more « usual » hardness for the region (power cuts, and poor healthcare quality sometimes resulting in contamination). Furthermore, rumours recently grew that Uzbek authorities had initiated a forced sterilization campaign in order to curb overcrowding in the region. All this does little to appease griefs against the Uzbek government, which has grown increasingly anxious over the past months that unrest in Kyrgyzstan might spread to Uzbek parts of the Ferghana Valley. Indeed, in 2005, an uprising in Andijan closely followed the Kyrgyz tulip revolution. Although its bloody crushing has so far deterred any new protest in Uzbekistan, Uzbek authorities are afraid that the troubles shaking southern Kyrgyzstan could provide opportunities for troublemakers at home.

Musical chairs in Madrid and Tashkent?

Zeromax's current problems should not be separated from the bigger picture of Uzbek politics. Gulnara Karimova, President Karimov's daughter, has long been considered as a possible heir to her father. However, recent developments suggest it might after all not be the case. Indeed, Gulnara is said to be a controversial figure and would thus not make a consensual leader when the time comes to succeed the father. Most important perhaps, she remains a women, and most likely unable to hold power for long in a rather conservative and patriarchal society.

Whether Gulnara Karimova is being forces out of succession or willingly accepting to stay out of politics has no great interest for today. Rather, it would be interesting to know whether or not President Islam Karimov has supported this evolution. Indeed, the worsening situation of the countries and the subsequent fears it could be destabilized may have emboldened some rival clans in Uzbek politics. The recent troubles experienced by Zeromax would thus be the sign of Karimov's diminishing control over the Uzbek state apparatus.

Feeding the Bear: soviet military logistics in Afghanistan

Scene from the motion picture "9th Company" (9 Рота)

Though Afghanistan has been invaded many times, it has yet never been totally conquered since a foreign invasion force can hardly maintain itself in the country. This is mainly due to harsh climate, terrain and poor communication infrastructure, resulting in a logistical nightmare such as the one experienced by the Soviet Union between 1979 and 1989. In order to face unexpected challenges, Soviet logistics adapted itself to Afghanistan, as did the whole 40th army.

Soviet logistic organizational structure: limits and evolutions

It became clear since the very beginning of the conflict that soviet supply structures, designed for a large-scale conflict against NATO or China was not adapted to a low-intensity conflict involving a smaller number of forces that would-be World War III. In particular, the pyramidal organization intended to give good theatre-level reactivity proved inadequate because it failed to provide good tactical flexibility. Order and supply invariably had to travel the whole command and hierarchical chain, which demanded a lot of time.

Other elements plagued soviet logistics. Among other things, many units deployed initially did not carry with them enough supply and spare parts for this type of conflict, and transport priorities did not match real supply needs (missiles and ammunitions rather than food, medical and fuel supplies, were shipped as soon as possible).

Alleviating and protecting the roads

In the beginning, the Soviets did not plan to stay long, and they organized most supply operations from facilities in the USSR without building any significant one in Afghanistan. However, when the Red Army realized that it was here to stay, it build several important supply depots (in Herat and Pol-e-Kormi) and maintenance facilities (in Herat and Jalalabad) to relieve those in Kabul. Other less important facilities and pipelines were built along the main roads to ease traffic, routine maintenance and driver support.

Map of Afghanistan's road network and main soviet bases.

Credits: Army magazine, January 1988.

Finally, in order to protect this network, the Red Army built numerous bases protected by fortifications, minefields, and garrisoned with troops and artillery. This was however not enough to provide full security, hence the need for convoy escort and road patrols.

Mobile convoy protection elements

Defence of logistical fluxes was indispensable (ambushes often resulted into loss of hardware, sometimes do the mujahiddins, and roads closing for several hours) and required many troops that could not be employed in offensive operations. It must be noted that soviet logistics had to supply the expeditionary force (110.000 men), the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's (DRA) armed forces and part of the civilian population, which dramatically increased stress on transportation capabilities.

Units patrolled the roads night and day, searching for mujahideens, mines and roadblocks, or simply road sections suitable for ambushes. Furthermore, ahead of every convoy was a "movement support detachment" tasked to repair the roads and clear it from obstacle and mines (mostly with sniffer-dogs and hand-held detectors, since the terrain did not allow the deployment of mine-removing vehicles). Despite these precautions, the convoys were still frequently attacked, hence the necessity for them to have good self-defence capabilities (especially given that rescue units rushing to the ambush sites were themselves frequently ambushed on the way).

Because of the risks, convoys only moved by day, advancing not faster than the movement support detachment ahead (which explains the length of the trips). Survival chances of a convoy being proportional to its size, the Soviets organized columns of several hundreds of vehicles stretching on large distances, protected by escorts in the head, middle and end. However, Afghan roads being narrow, these escorts could hardly move from one  part of the convoy to another, making protection difficult. Furthermore, the great number of bottlenecks made it easy for mujahideens to block vital roads by blowing vehicles that would become wreckages not removed before hours. This vulnerability was particularly illustrated by the 1982 Salang tunnel disaster, when a collision triggered a fire in the tunnel which resulted in numerous casualties and the closure of the vital road from Termez to Kabul.

Soviet logistics in combat

As supply convoys became a priority target for insurgents, the Soviet military had to strengthen this component of its military apparatus. Traditionally, Red Army supply units were made of conscripts and reservists, whose two-year term did not permit adequate training. As a result, these units at first poorly performed in combat or in driving heavy Kamaz trucks (less manoeuvrable that regular ones but better adapted to the poor quality of Afghanistan's roads). As the supply units became more professional, it became clear that they had to master more combat-oriented skills, like shooting from a moving vehicle with assault rifles or vehicle mounted guns (especially the ZU-23 AA gun, which proved adequate to target insurgents shooting from high grounds).

Ongoing attacks made the task of drivers, engineers and pipeline troops (aka trubashis) very difficult and in many occasions they had to perform their duties under fire. It is then no surprise that these units acquired real prestige during the war in Afghanistan, and that medals awarded achievements earned in this "Highway war".

The role of air support

Saturation of ground supply roads led the Red Army to rely more intensively on aircraft to transport hardware to Afghanistan, supply isolated or besieged garrisons and evacuate the wounded. Despite its capabilities reduced by 25% due to the climate and the altitude, the helicopter became a symbol of the Soviet-Afghan war. Transport helicopters like the Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-26 became the workhorses of airborne logistics, while the Mi-24 attack gunship was extensively used for close air support and convoy escort tasks (though in this last case, its rotors were vulnerable to enemy fire coming from the high grounds).

Silk road and "string of pearls": China's "Go West" strategy and its implications for eurasian transportation

The renewed attention for Central Asia following the opening of new logistical routes headed to Afghanistan and China's growing influence in the region has drawn attention on a potential re-opening of the legendary (though long forgotten) Silk Road. Indeed, numerous projects currently aim to develop road and railway networks for trade purposes. However, a massive shift of sea trade in favor of the so-called "Eurasian land bridge" is yet unlikely for diverse reasons.

Central Asia, a complex itinerary.

Numerous man-made factors today prevent thriving development of exchanges in Central Asia. On the one hand, the frequent boundary disputes between neighboring states in the region often result in border closings that hamper trade. On the other hand, default of harmonization of national transport regulations and the insistence of Central Asian States to develop transport networks on national rather than regional basis makes things even more complex. The resulting incertitude (transport costs and time often vary significantly), associated with other problems, seriously hampers development of trade in the region.

Even if most obstacles of political or regulatory origins were to be removed (which is today very unlikely), numerous physical factors would still impede large volumes of trade goods to be moved through the Eurasian land bridge. First of all, the difference in rail gauges between the former Soviet Union, China and Europe implies complex procedures at border check points (switching wheel-sets or moving the cargo on other wagons). In addition, Central Asia's road network, though currently used well under its maximum capacity, is not designed to support the intensive transport of heavy cargo. Furthermore, soviet-era transportation network was built to fit exchanges inside the USSR, not Eurasian trade (most of the lines follow a North-South orientation instead of a East-West one). Finally, the terrain and the climate are particularly harsh, especially when closing from the Indian subcontinent. High mountains make passage impossible, except in a few narrow passes, often blocked by avalanches, landslides and winter snowfalls.

Advantages of the sea route

Sea routes currently used are indeed more adapted than planned land routes when it comes to mass trade of cheap goods. Indeed, size limitations on the oceans are almost nonexistent, and it is possible for ships loaded with hundreds of containers to navigate around the world. Besides, these sea routes link between them important markets (East Asia, India, and the Persian Gulf in particular), far more lucrative than Central Asian markets currently limited in size, which makes sea travel much more profitable. Thus, a cargo ship can load hundreds of containers in China, unload some and load others in India before continuing to Europe.

China's policy in this domain seems to confirm the higher importance of sea routes. Beijing has indeed built a large network of alliances aiming to secure its main supply routes in the Indian Ocean. This expansion of Chinese influence is visible through construction of deep-water harbors in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan(Gwadar), able to host or support both trade ships and military vessels. Indeed, China's naval ambitions also translates into the recent development of its military fleet, with the ultimate goal (if Indian and American fears, China's principal competitors and most likely opponents, are to be confirmed) being to be able to operate far from continental China.

Conclusion

Developing in parallel sea and land routes to Europe and its energy suppliers (current or potential), China seeks to have as much alternatives as possible should a full-fledged conflict occur (especially with the United States, which still enjoy naval dominance). By building harbors and reinforcing its fleet, it seeks to protect sea routes linking it with the Persian Gulf, which still holds most of the world's energy reserves. However, it also secures  a land route used to reinforce its economic influence in Central Asia, and which could partially replace threatened sea routes. All the interest of the Eurasian corridor for China is that it is rather safe from disruption by its most-likely adversaries (the USA and India). Indeed, despite having some bases in Central Asia, it is unlikely that the US Army could wage a large scale conflict against China so far inland.

In the logistic and commercial domain, we can draw a parallel between the Eurasian Corridor and the Arctic road. Despite their potential, these routes cannot allow the transit of more than reduced volumes of goods. Thus, it is likely that existing and planned transport infrastructures, in the foreseeable future, will rather be used for bilateral trade between Central Asia and its neighbors. To some extent, transcontinental land transportation could allow for faster transport of valuable goods between China and Europe, providing an intermediary solution between sea (cheap but long) and air (fast but costly) shipping. This would somehow be the return of the Silk Road to its historical function: transcontinental shipping of high-value goods (spices, gems, silk, etc...).

Note: special thanks to Romain Leconte for his assistance regarding information on China's naval ambitions.

С днём победы!

A bit late, however my internet access in Moscow did not allow posting.

The 65th birthday of the allied victory on Nazi Germany was the occasion for president Medvedev to put on quite a show: impressive military parade, foreign troops and heads of state (at least those who didn't cancel at the last minute) in Moscow, a bill already judged far too expensive by the opposition... even the weather seemed to have been planned. And as far as I know, security was tighter than last year (metal detectors and limited alcohol sale in the city center, among other things).

Whatever, here's an occasion to remember that World War II did take its toll on the Eastern Front...

Afghanistan on tracks?

An article, released on May 5th, announces the construction of Afghanistan's first significant railways. The country had so far no (or very little) railways, due to the will of the Afghan Kings' to protect their country from foreign intervention. In their eyes, railways were likely invasion and supply routes, not mere opportunities for economic development.

An interesting piece of reading before something more consistent on railway transportation in Eurasia, its assets and limitations.