jeudi 24 juin 2010

Отпуск...

... or, for those not speaking Russian, I'm taking a one-month break, between Paris and Eurasia. Blogging is likely to be minimal these days and should resume normally by the end of July.

mercredi 16 juin 2010

Unstability in Kirgyzstan : prelude to a civil war or mere riots?


The situation in South Kirghizstan is currently a source of concern to many. Troubles already left over 100 dead, about 1.500 wounded and triggered a mass exodus of ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan (official sources set the toll to about 80.000 displaced people, but unofficial sources released much higher figures ranging from 200.000 to 300.000). In order to quell the unrest, the Kirghiz provisional government has officially asked Russian troops to be deployed (somethning still refused by Moscow). However, should the government fail to stabilize the situation in the country, the issue of foreign intervention (and more especially of Russian military intervention) would come up again on the table.

Old hatreds, unusual unrest

Osh has been for some times the theatre of bloody ethnic riots mainly directed against the Uzbek population of the city. Many Uzbek already fled the country, while those still in the city barricaded so to avoid death by the hand of thugs, shunning any movement even to seek medical care or provisions. Several fires have reportedly been started by armed bands, which prevent firemen access to the sites.

It is today evident that the riots were started by elements linked to the criminal world, quite powerful in the area and taking advantage of political instability to settle scores. The assassination of an important crime boss, Aybek Mirsidikov (a.k.a "Black Aybek") is reported to have started the ongoing surge in criminal activity. However, it is thought that "external" forces are actually using criminal organizations as "contractors" to pursue their own goals. This reminds us of land property seizures that occurred following the ousting of president Bakiyev, some of them being carried out by fairly organized groups with violence. Today, it seems that the goal of those behind the resurgence in ethnic tensions and riots is to prevent the constitutional referendum planned later this month from taking place smoothly.

Tensions between Uzbek and Kyrgyz always existed in the Ferghana Valley, although they seldom triggered full fledged ethnic fighting (except in 1990), are deeply rooted. Several elements still fuel tensions between communities. First of all, alleged discrimination against the Uzbek in the administration, elected bodies and  regarding population statistics are regularly put forward. Also, numerous Uzbek businessmen complain about racket by corrupted officials from a mainly Kirghiz bureaucracy. Finally, the issue of land, already evoked in an earlier article, also plays its part.

The fightings also had consequences in matters not directly linked to security. Due to unrest, supply of essential goods and services to the city has been brought to a halt for several days already, which led to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation there as well as to scarcity of food and water. Outside of Osh, mass exodus of ethnic Uzbek in neighbouring Uzbekistan is putting an additional stress on the already crowed (and unstable) Ferghana Valley.

Attempts by the police to quell the unrest have so far proved unsuccessful, mainly because it lacks number and adequate equipment. In order to reverse the course of events and restore order, the provisional government initiated a partial mobilization of the army and sent additional police forces in the South. Additionally, it has called for Russian intervention in the country to support the government, while non governmental organization called for the UN to intervene militarily to halt the fightings.
Kyrgyz forces patrolling the streets of Osh
(Credits: REUTERS/lemonde.fr)

Are we headed towards a Russian direct involvement?

Neighbouring countries and influential powers with interests in the region have so far refused to get involved directly, rather sending medical and humanitarian assistance. While Russia and the CSTO have refused to send armed support, it is unlikely that the US and NATO will further stretch a military apparatus already to its limits with a stability operation in Southern Afghanistan proving more challenging than initially planned. The SCO, which gathered on the 11th of June in a summit in Tashkent, for its part made no sign that it was ready to commit itself actively.

However, direct foreign military intervention cannot be discarded, should the provisional government be unable to restore order. Indeed, many neighbouring states cannot permit unrest to settle in. Uzbekistan is both concerned with Islamic radicals (and especially IMO militants) taking refuge in this region and ethnic Uzbek refugees flooding in from Kirghiz Ferghana. Neither can the US and NATO countries engaged in Afghanistan allow such a situation to develop near supply lines vital to their campaign in Afghanistan. China, on its side, is not ready to accept a grey zone where Uigur Islamic militants could one day take refuge. Finally, Russia cannot allow this part of what is still its backyard slide into anarchy.

Being the heir to the defunct USSR, Russia remains the main security provider for the States of the region, a role it has so far defended against its Chinese "partner", with whom competition on the economic field is impossible. By refusing (or being unable) to rescue an ally requesting assistance would send a very negative signal and prompt other powers to take Russia's place in the area. China could seize the opportunity to become the new security provider, while Uzbekistan may chose to intervene in an attempt to stop the persecutions and the uncontrolled flow of refugees.

Thus, it appears that Russia has not formally discarded military intervention, while it reinforced its troops in the country. Moscow is however likely to shun as much as possible any further risky military operation, given its experiences in Chechnya and Afghanistan. It will rather wait for threats of direct involvement and tougher actions taken by the Kirghiz interim government to give effects before moving in, preferably with strong multilateral legitimation by CSTO or even SCO. Yet the prospect for such a scenario might well vanish, as reports of riots turning into mere looting of abandoned buildings and businesses started to come from Osh recently.
 Frontier guards of Uzbekistan helping ethnic Uzbek to flee Kyrgyzstan
(Credits: www.eurasianet.org)

jeudi 10 juin 2010

Opium: "poison de rêve" and Russia's nightmare


As to answer NATO's ongoing offensive in Southern Afghanistan, an international forum dedicated to the issue of Afghan narcotics started in Moscow yesterday. A few days earlier, Russia's defence minister made clear the Kremlin's disappointment regarding what it considers as insufficient efforts by NATO forces to fight poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The question is of paramount importance to Russia, far more than to most NATO countries.

Narcotics in Central Asia; from local use to global trade

Climate in many regions of Central Asia and Afghanistan perfectly suits cultivation of crops such as hashish, poppy or ephedra, which serve as raw materials for several psycho-active substances. Logically, the locals quickly learned to use these plants for relaxation or medicinal purposes (one can think of the use made of opium as a painkiller in Joseph Kessel's Horsemen).

 Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and, to some extent, Central Asia (under soviet rule till recently) did not quickly increase before 1979 and the beginning of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. This growth is due to the conflict itself (the mujaheddin used opium as a source of income to fund their jihad) and to measures of interdiction taken in several countries (Turkey, Pakistan to some extent and Iran after the Islamic Revolution). Following the Soviet withdrawal and the expansion of the civil war, poppy cultivation further increased. Indeed, since US aid had stopped, warlords used drug trade to fund their militias, while peasants had found with opium a valuable crop in these troubled times. Finally, poppy does not require as much water as other crops to grow, and once harvested it can be kept some times; both things are important in a country where water and roads allowing fast travel to trade centres are scarce.
Genesis of a cancer

Before the arrival of Soviet troops  in Afghanistan, consumption of drugs was minimal in the USRR. However, combat stress experienced by soviet troops (most of them were reservists or draftees) led to a sharp increase in the consumption of narcotics, which created a demand inside USSR. This led to the development of drug rings involving Afghan producers and soviet smugglers, which outlived the end of the war and of the Soviet Union itself. After the collapse of the USSR, poor surveillance of the new borders and generalized impoverishment  created the conditions for large-scale drug trade to thrive. The civil war in Tajikistan further eased the development of continental smuggling rings (all parties resorted to drug trade to fund their struggle), especially due to the presence of ethnic Tajiks on both side of the Afghan-Tajik border and the widespread use of Russian as a lingua franca in former USSR. These rings still benefit from simple migration procedures between Russia and Tajikistan, as well as of the involvement of officials in drug trade (including veterans of the Tajik civil war now holding power seats). Finally, it appears that members of the Russian peacekeeping force in the country used military transports (not subject to controls) to smuggle drugs inside Russia, which prompted Moscow to tighten control over its soldiers abroad.

Because of Iran's bitter fight against drug trade, most of Afghan-made heroin now crosses Central Asia and Russia, whose borders are less tightly monitored. Complex boundaries, rampant corruption and diminishing volumes (smugglers now increasingly process poppy into heroin into Afghanistan rather than shipping raw materials outside of the country) make it harder for law enforcement units to intercept drug shipments. Eventually, transit areas become markets and Russia now has to cope with huge drug trade-related problems that impact its demography, endanger its future and fuel corruption. According to a UN paper, 30.000 Russians die every year because of heroin (one third of the 100.000 yearly toll of heroin addiction), while several millions (estimates range from 1,5 to 6 million people between 15 and 64) are heroin-addicted. Drug addiction also poses public health (HIV spreads through syringes exchanges) and socio-economic long-term problems (over-mortality of heroin-addicted youth, criminalization of the society, and economic weight of a significant population of addicts).

Roots of evil

Russia's growing concern and impatience are due to the importance of the drug trafficking problem and to its origins. Indeed, the take-off of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan occurred with the CIA's silent consent, while opium production kept on growing since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. Furthermore, the ISAF today concentrates on the fight against the insurgency, which draws profits from drug trade but is only one actor among others. Moscow especially reproaches NATO with renouncing poppy crops elimination because such policy would turn rural populations against ISAF forces. These prefer let the Afghan security forces deal with the problem, preferably by destroying labs and already processed heroin rather than burning crops. However, the Afghan National Police is plagued by corruption, and has so far not proved very efficient to tackle the problem

Moscow further denounced Washington's double standards on this issue ; while the US stress the importance not to alienate the population in Afghanistan, they long supported aggressive crops-elimination policies in Latin America, especially in Colombia. Russia also complained of poor cooperation between security forces in Afghanistan (regardless of their nationality) and Central Asian law enforcement agencies.

As a conclusion, it must be stressed that the Colombian experience in the field of counter-narcotics is worth a look and potentially interesting for upcoming operations in Afghanistan. This “Integral Action” doctrine emphasizes the need for coercion (elimination of illegal crops and dismantlement of illegal armed bands) and people-centred operations (population control and aid programs to promote alternative crops). The French armed forces' experience in Easter Afghanistan is also relevant in this domain.


Update (10.06.10): here is a potentially interesting article relased by ferghana.ru (in Russian) dedicated to drug trafficking through Kazakhstan. Let's also note that the subject of narcotics trade from Afghanistan will certainly be on the agenda of the SCO summit currently underway in Tashkent.