Tajikistan headed towards a civil war?

Last September 19th, an ambush lain in the gorge of Kamarob resulted in the death  of 28 Tajik soldiers (according to official sources). A group linked to Al-Qaeda later endorsed responsibility for the attacks. This gorge is located in the Rasht Valley region, in center Tajikistan, and was a well-known stronghold of the islamic guerrillas during the 92-97 civil war. Some official sources also stated that foreign fighters took part in the ambush. This bloody skirmish follows several earlier attacks and may be the sign of  deteriorating security in the country, which explains why they are taken very seriously by Tajik authorities. Those have already launched a large sweeping operation targeting the rebels that took part to the attacks, while an earlier statement (August 2nd) by the commander in chief of the Russian airborne troops lets us think that Moscow is closely watching the situation.

Tajikistan on the verge of yet another civil war?

Deteriorating security is nothing new nor surprising in Tajikistan. In 2009 already, they were concerns about djihadist fighters fleeing the Pakistani offensive and seeking refuge in Northern Afghanistan and in neighboring regions. It was thought in particular that fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had fought alongside the Taleban in 2001 and used Tajikistan to launch attacks in Uzbekistan, had returned to their former sanctuaries.

These fears came true on August 23rd 2010, when several inmates (most of them non-tajik) escaped from a high-security compound. Two weeks later, a suicide bombing targeted a militia office in Khodjent, later to be followed by another bombing against a nightclub in Dushanbe on September 6th. Finally, tajik security forces reported skirmishes with Taleban fighters in border areas on September 11th, an incident that was followed by the September 19th ambush.

Though Taleban insurgents from Afghanistan are a threat to Tajikistan's security, they are nothing more that a potential catalyzer for other risks against the country's stability. Indeed, since the end of the civil war in 1997, increasing political repression, inefficiency of a corruption-ridden state and a series of catastrophes made the country more and more unstable.

From the 1997 peace settlement to today's events: a balance more than ambivalent.

The 1997 peace agreement ended the civil war in Tajikistan between the former communist elite from the western parts of the country (Khujand and Kulyab regions) and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), dominated by easterners(Garm and Gorno-Badakshan regions) and in which the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) played important political and military roles. It thus became the first (an only) Islamic political party to be tolerated by authorities in Central Asia, and to be allow to run for election. However, since then, President Emomali Rakhmonov constantly struggled to marginalize the opposition, which has almost disappeared from parliament. Furthermore, the State is now hunting down former opposition combatants (that have since then abandoned the armed struggled or have joined the official security forces) under cover of counter-narcotics operations. Finally, as in the rest of Central Asia, the repression against the Hizb-ut-Tahrir may result into parts of its members (most of them ethnic Uzbeks) to abandon this extremist yet nonviolent movement to engage in armed struggle.

Not only has the State engaged into a policy of systematic political crackdown ; it is also deeply corrupt. In particular, the efficiency and impartiality of the security forces are greatly hampered by widespread nepotism (loyalty to President Rakhmonov's clan more than skill and competence are the key to advancement). The same goes with the judiciary system, thought to be corrupt and inefficient by the local population, which increasingly turns to sharia law and mediation by clergymen to settle usual and civil conflicts like divorce. Finally, politicians and officials tend to use their position to make their personal business prosper. For example, a mysterious company, registered in the British Virgin Islands whose ownership remains undisclosed recently installed tooboothes along the Dushanbe-Khodjent road (which links the capital to the country's second city, located in the Ferghana Valley). Inhabitants and traders crossing the region have to pay a quite important sum every time they pass, which tends to exasperate them. And most of them think that those who allowed the company to collect tolls on the road are the very same in whose pockets the money finally ends...

Finally, external or uncontrolled events such as power shortages (due to tensions with Uzbekistan and poor maintenance of the power distribution system), droughts, poor harvests and the world economic crisis do nothing to improve the situation. The crisis is particularly impacting those countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, heavily dependent on remittances by expat workers, whose capabilities for money transfer have shrunk. Growing insurgent activity in northern Afghanistan and the progressive criminalization of the society due to increased drug trafficking in the country also tend to have negative effects in the field of stability...

NATO, China and Russia facing a spilling-over Afghan chaos

The accumulation of all those elements is not concern-free, especially given the arrival of battle hardened Islamic guerrillas in the area. Indeed, poor quality tajik troops are not a challenge to Islamic fighters that, although they are not always familiar to the area (most veterans of the Civil War are simply too old to fight), are hardened by years of combat against NATO and Pakistani troops. There is also a real risk that the population, impoverished by the crisis and exasperated by the corruption of its leaders, turns to Islamic insurgents or drug traffickers, for financial or ideological reasons. In particular, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which is ideologically close to the IMU, is very popular among Uzbeks, which makes this group particularly vulnerable to infiltration by islamic insurgents (one must remember that the IMU was formed by Uzbek islamic guerrillas that had already taken part to the Civil War). Thus, it would not be extraordinary to see local Islamic movements taking advantage of popular support and experience transfer from afghan rebels to become a deadly foe.

While Kyrgyzstan's stability is already greatly compromised, increased unrest in Tajikistan is the last thing the different actors with interests in the area need. NATO, for its part, has no need to see the Northern Distribution Network endangered by Islamic insurgents outside Afghanistan. China, for its part, cannot stay idle while chaos in Tajikistan threatens the stability of its own restless Sin-Kiang province. Finally, Russia, by far the most deeply concerned power in the region, cannot permit Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to slide into anarchy. By doing so, it would allow drug traffickers to operate freely from the Afghan border to the boundaries of Kazakhstan, which is to enter in a customs union with Russia by 2011. And the last thing Russia needs is tons of heroin arriving undisturbed to its border, while it already has huge problems with drug addiction among its population.

Kyrgyzstan on the verge of a critical vote

Electoral poster, Kyrgyzstan.

Credits: ferghana.ru

Notwithstanding the chaos in which it has sunk since the ouster of president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan is now headed towards elections, due for this year's 10th of October. No less than 29 parties will be in competition for the 120 seats of the new legislature. Though this kind of consultation is often seen as a way to unblock a stranded political situation, especially after the type of unrest the country has gone through, in this case it could further destabilize Kyrgyzstan.

A deeply shattered country

The number of parties competing for seats and the poverty of their respective political programs can be explained, among other things, by the fact that some are mere tools for the advancement of an individual's or a clan's interests. An official post generally enables access to public resources that allow to protect or develop more or less legal businesses. In the present case, a seat in parliament also means immunity from judiciary pursuits, something bound to interest some local crime bosses eager to retain some freedom of action to conduct their business.

Among the parties officially registered for the upcoming election, Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) has drawn the attention of several observers. This party gathers many officials and followers of the fallen president, and makes up for the lack of relevance of its political program by mobilizing Kyrgyz from the southern regions through harsh nationalistic statements and stances, firm rejection of the provisional government's legitimacy, and refusal of foreign intervention (especially by the OSCE) in the country's inner affairs. It is led by Kashymbek Tashiev, Bakiyev's former minister of emergency situations, who became known after declaring that the Kyrgyz did not get the respect they deserve in their own state, and that Kyrgyzstan's ethnic minorities had to be culturally assimilated to prevent future ethnic unrest. 

The mayor of Osh, Melyzbek Myrzakmatov, among Bakiev's close followers, illustrates this strongly anti-government stance. Named by the former president, he successfully resisted attempts by the provisional government to have him to step down. He makes no mystery of his refusal to abide by Bishkek's rulings ("Provisional government directives have no legal force in the South"), and has launched an urban policy that some equate to ethnic cleansing. He has indeed announced the construction of collective housings in Osh's Uzbek districts that were destroyed in June, officially to house both Uzbek and Kyrgyz, but few doubt that only Kyrgyz will move in.

Roots of evil: the lingering heritage of the USSR's politics of nationalities.

Kyrgyzstan is a soviet-engineered country, that dates back to the early days of the USSR's politics of nationalities, at the time under the responsibility of the People's commissar for nationalities, Joseph Stalin. This policy advocated the creation of national republics along ethnic principles ("one people, on language, one territory"), though it had to be tempered so that the new republics could enjoy a minimum viability, hence the inclusion of parts of the Uzbek-populated Ferghana Valley into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In soviet times,  Moscow's control allowed ethnic conflicts between local Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Kyrgyz, and immigrants (whether Europeans or deported populations from the Caucasus or the Volga Basin) to remain frozen. However, the situation worsened after the implosion of the USRR. Relations between communities have since then gradually deteriorated.

Latent tensions that existed in Kyrgyzstan since the early 1990's brutally surfaced this summer. They first took the form of land occupation and property destructions, essentially at the expanse of ethnic minorities (Uzbeks and Meshketians Turks). Then, the bloody June riots in Osh, that heavily affected Uzbeks, shattered for good an already fragile inter-community trust, even though it is now likely that the riots were organized and that many Kyrgyz assisted and protected their Uzbek neighbours. Today, tensions result in occasional clashes and reciprocal mistrust. 

More intense in the South, anti-Uzbek feelings are particularly strong among the youth, which proved to be less influenced by calls to reconciliation. Additionaly, deep tensions continue to exist between Kyrgyz in the North and those in the South, traditionally poorer and kept away from power (except of course during the Bakiev era). The gap is today so deep that some even consider a partition of the country in two States regrouped in a federation. 

Towards the engulfment of the Ferghana Valley?

The October elections are a high risk vote. Numerous opposition parties indeed have youth sections that occasionaly serve as shock squads. If the result came to be contested, they could be used to spread disorder. This would certainly increase the Norsth-South gap, something that reminds us of the early days of the civil war in neighbouring Tajikistan. Furthermore, continuing persecutions against Uzbeks could result in some of them resorting to violence, whether by setting up paramilitary groups, or by turning to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan for assistance. The IMU would certainly accept, since a Kyrgyz sanctuary would be a key asset in its crusade to spread havoc in the entire Ferghana Valley. Furthermore, numerous Uzbek diasporas exist, including in Saudi Arabia, rich and influential enough to provide assistance regarding this domain.

One has to hope that calls to ethnic clash by nationalistic parties remain without widespread effect among the Kyrgyz, and/or that the fear of Moscow's reaction should the country fall into anarchy deter extremist elements to take active measures. The provisional government's call for amnesty of corrupted official (should they return the sums they took) provides a glimmer of hope for the upcoming post-elections period.

A "Peace Canal" for Central Asia?

While fires were restarting in Russia, an important summit on cross-border cooperation gathered in Ust-Kamenogorsk, last 7th September, Russian and Kazakh presidents. On this occasion, kazakh head of state Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested to resurrect one of the pharaonic projects of the defunct USSR. Abandonned during the Perestroïka, this project advocated for the diversion of part of the siberian rivers that end up in the Arctic Ocean to the South.

President Dmitri Medvedev, though he did not discard any possibility, stated that he favoured the restoration of Central Asia's soviet-inherited water infrastructures, who suffered a great deal of damage due to lack of maintenance. Also, a more consensual management of the region's water resources, which is today hampered by lingering border conflicts between the States that succeeded the Soviet Union, would help tackle the lack of water.

Prometheus in Siberia: genesis of an aborted project

Preparatory studies begun by injunction of the Central Committee in 1968. The project itself was to be divided into a western part, covering European territories of the USSR, and an eastern part in Southern Siberia and Central Asia, aimed at balancing water distribution in the Soviet Union.

In the West, it was planned to transfer about 19 km3 from Lake Onega and several rivers of Western Siberia to the Volga and Kama rivers yearly. This diversion was by far the less problematic part of the project. Its cost was, in 1982, estimated to 4 billion dollars.

The diversion of the rivers in Central Siberia (actually, 7% of the annual stream were to be diverted) was however far more problematic. During the first phase of the project, 27 km3 were to be withdrawn yearly from the Ob and Irytsh rivers. A 2500 km long canal leaving from the junction of the two rivers would have carried the waters into the Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria. Because of seasonal differences in the river flow, water was to be withdrawn from the Ob and lower Irytsh between and April, and from the middle and upper Irytsh the rest of the time. The project had a planned cost of 53 billion dollars, which included the construction of irrigation and water distribution facilities. During the second phase of the project, the volume of water diverted was to reach 60 km3 a year through increased pumping capacities and canal size.

The cost of this program was partly due to the numerous technical obstacles it had to overcome. Indeed, because it was necessary to revert the course of the lower Irytsh, numerous dams and pumping stations would have been necessary to transfer water to a reservoir near Tobolsk, and from there to the Sibaral canal. However, in spite of this, the project was nonetheless seriously considered. By diverting waters otherwise lost in the Arctic Ocean and in the empty regions of Northern Siberia, it would have permitted to reduce water shortages in Southern Siberia and Central Asia. These heavily populated regions also have soils suitable for agriculture, which an additional input of water would have permitted to irrigate more widely (sources state that the project would have permitted to irrigate 4 million hectares). Furthermore, additional water supply would have contributed to restore the hydraulic balance in the Aral sea region, whose fate is now widely known. Indeed, this inland sea depends on the Amu-Daria and the Syr-Daria for its water supply, two rivers that were already heavily diverted for the needs of cotton cultivation

Map of the Sibaral canal

Credits:  http://www.schiffundtechnik.com 

 This project, however, rapidly drew strong criticism and started a debate whose lenght and intensity were unusual in pre-glasnost USSR. Apart for financial costs, that were deemed under-valued or impossible to compensate in a reasonable time, the critics put forward numerous technical and ecological arguments. First of all, massive water transfer were threatening fishing activities on the Ob river, and Northern Siberia's marshes with drying out. This would have increased risks of wildfires and threatened oil and gas exploitation in the region. Besides, 25 to 50% of the water transferred would have been lost due to infiltration and evaporation not even to mention the amount of energy necessary to power the pumping facilities reverting the course of the Irytsh. Finally, massive water transfer alone cannot solve Central Asia's water scarcity problem. A more efficient use of local water resources would allow to reduce water stress through water savings. In this respect, several irrigation methods used in Turkestan, Iran and Afghanistan for centuries could usefully inspire today's engineers.

With the beggining of the glasnost, this debate was one of the first to go public (ecology was one of the first topic to be open to free discussion). The project was officially dropped in 1986, and was perceived as the first victory of the "civil society" against a deaf bureaucracy clearly more attached to its prerogatives and subsidies than to the public interest.

Current implications of the project

It is no wonder that the initiative to resurrect the Sibaral came from a head of state from Central Asia. Back in Soviet times, the project was widely backed by the region's apparatchiki and administrations. The Russians are more divided on this matter. Environmentalist experts and association are clearly opposed to a renewed "crime of the century" like the one that emptied the Aral sea. Some circles close to the Kremlin are however more favourable to the project. Yuri Lujkov, mayor of Moscow and a personal friend of Vladimir Putin, did not hide its support for the project, as did not several high-ranking officials in charge of the project back in Soviet times. For him, the project would allow increased agricultural and economic activity, thus contributing to fight unstability, islamic radicalism and terrorism in Central Asia. More important, the republics bordering the Aral sea (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) would face increased dependency to Moscow. Finally, more water in Southern Siberia would also mean less risk of wildfires.

Such a project carries numerous political opportunities for Russia in the former Soviet territories. However, its cost could block it from even being started, since Russia is not in a position to fund it alone. However, China, which is already involved in the development of hydraulic power in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, could back this project, which reminds of its own project to divert the Yangtze river, with funds and expertise. Water imports from Russia to Central Asia would partly solve the problems posed by its own energy projects in the Tian Shan, which could then continue without risk of generating grave regional tensions.

Whatever, one could hardly fail to remain the Kazakh president that some maintenance and upgrade works on the existing systems would be a more money-saving good start, that would besides help prevent some catastrophes... 

 Credits: Libération