While fires were restarting in Russia, an important summit on cross-border cooperation gathered in Ust-Kamenogorsk, last 7th September, Russian and Kazakh presidents. On this occasion, kazakh head of state Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested to resurrect one of the pharaonic projects of the defunct USSR. Abandonned during the Perestroïka, this project advocated for the diversion of part of the siberian rivers that end up in the Arctic Ocean to the South.
President Dmitri Medvedev, though he did not discard any possibility, stated that he favoured the restoration of Central Asia's soviet-inherited water infrastructures, who suffered a great deal of damage due to lack of maintenance. Also, a more consensual management of the region's water resources, which is today hampered by lingering border conflicts between the States that succeeded the Soviet Union, would help tackle the lack of water.
Prometheus in Siberia: genesis of an aborted project
Preparatory studies begun by injunction of the Central Committee in 1968. The project itself was to be divided into a western part, covering European territories of the USSR, and an eastern part in Southern Siberia and Central Asia, aimed at balancing water distribution in the Soviet Union.
In the West, it was planned to transfer about 19 km3 from Lake Onega and several rivers of Western Siberia to the Volga and Kama rivers yearly. This diversion was by far the less problematic part of the project. Its cost was, in 1982, estimated to 4 billion dollars.
The diversion of the rivers in Central Siberia (actually, 7% of the annual stream were to be diverted) was however far more problematic. During the first phase of the project, 27 km3 were to be withdrawn yearly from the Ob and Irytsh rivers. A 2500 km long canal leaving from the junction of the two rivers would have carried the waters into the Syr-Daria and Amu-Daria. Because of seasonal differences in the river flow, water was to be withdrawn from the Ob and lower Irytsh between and April, and from the middle and upper Irytsh the rest of the time. The project had a planned cost of 53 billion dollars, which included the construction of irrigation and water distribution facilities. During the second phase of the project, the volume of water diverted was to reach 60 km3 a year through increased pumping capacities and canal size.
The cost of this program was partly due to the numerous technical obstacles it had to overcome. Indeed, because it was necessary to revert the course of the lower Irytsh, numerous dams and pumping stations would have been necessary to transfer water to a reservoir near Tobolsk, and from there to the Sibaral canal. However, in spite of this, the project was nonetheless seriously considered. By diverting waters otherwise lost in the Arctic Ocean and in the empty regions of Northern Siberia, it would have permitted to reduce water shortages in Southern Siberia and Central Asia. These heavily populated regions also have soils suitable for agriculture, which an additional input of water would have permitted to irrigate more widely (sources state that the project would have permitted to irrigate 4 million hectares). Furthermore, additional water supply would have contributed to restore the hydraulic balance in the Aral sea region, whose fate is now widely known. Indeed, this inland sea depends on the Amu-Daria and the Syr-Daria for its water supply, two rivers that were already heavily diverted for the needs of cotton cultivation
Map of the Sibaral canal
Credits: http://www.schiffundtechnik.com
This project, however, rapidly drew strong criticism and started a debate whose lenght and intensity were unusual in pre-glasnost USSR. Apart for financial costs, that were deemed under-valued or impossible to compensate in a reasonable time, the critics put forward numerous technical and ecological arguments. First of all, massive water transfer were threatening fishing activities on the Ob river, and Northern Siberia's marshes with drying out. This would have increased risks of wildfires and threatened oil and gas exploitation in the region. Besides, 25 to 50% of the water transferred would have been lost due to infiltration and evaporation not even to mention the amount of energy necessary to power the pumping facilities reverting the course of the Irytsh. Finally, massive water transfer alone cannot solve Central Asia's water scarcity problem. A more efficient use of local water resources would allow to reduce water stress through water savings. In this respect, several irrigation methods used in Turkestan, Iran and Afghanistan for centuries could usefully inspire today's engineers.
With the beggining of the glasnost, this debate was one of the first to go public (ecology was one of the first topic to be open to free discussion). The project was officially dropped in 1986, and was perceived as the first victory of the "civil society" against a deaf bureaucracy clearly more attached to its prerogatives and subsidies than to the public interest.
Current implications of the project
It is no wonder that the initiative to resurrect the Sibaral came from a head of state from Central Asia. Back in Soviet times, the project was widely backed by the region's apparatchiki and administrations. The Russians are more divided on this matter. Environmentalist experts and association are clearly opposed to a renewed "crime of the century" like the one that emptied the Aral sea. Some circles close to the Kremlin are however more favourable to the project. Yuri Lujkov, mayor of Moscow and a personal friend of Vladimir Putin, did not hide its support for the project, as did not several high-ranking officials in charge of the project back in Soviet times. For him, the project would allow increased agricultural and economic activity, thus contributing to fight unstability, islamic radicalism and terrorism in Central Asia. More important, the republics bordering the Aral sea (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) would face increased dependency to Moscow. Finally, more water in Southern Siberia would also mean less risk of wildfires.
Such a project carries numerous political opportunities for Russia in the former Soviet territories. However, its cost could block it from even being started, since Russia is not in a position to fund it alone. However, China, which is already involved in the development of hydraulic power in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, could back this project, which reminds of its own project to divert the Yangtze river, with funds and expertise. Water imports from Russia to Central Asia would partly solve the problems posed by its own energy projects in the Tian Shan, which could then continue without risk of generating grave regional tensions.
Whatever, one could hardly fail to remain the Kazakh president that some maintenance and upgrade works on the existing systems would be a more money-saving good start, that would besides help prevent some catastrophes...
Credits: Libération
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