Kyrgyzstan on the verge of a critical vote

Electoral poster, Kyrgyzstan.

Credits: ferghana.ru

Notwithstanding the chaos in which it has sunk since the ouster of president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan is now headed towards elections, due for this year's 10th of October. No less than 29 parties will be in competition for the 120 seats of the new legislature. Though this kind of consultation is often seen as a way to unblock a stranded political situation, especially after the type of unrest the country has gone through, in this case it could further destabilize Kyrgyzstan.

A deeply shattered country

The number of parties competing for seats and the poverty of their respective political programs can be explained, among other things, by the fact that some are mere tools for the advancement of an individual's or a clan's interests. An official post generally enables access to public resources that allow to protect or develop more or less legal businesses. In the present case, a seat in parliament also means immunity from judiciary pursuits, something bound to interest some local crime bosses eager to retain some freedom of action to conduct their business.

Among the parties officially registered for the upcoming election, Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) has drawn the attention of several observers. This party gathers many officials and followers of the fallen president, and makes up for the lack of relevance of its political program by mobilizing Kyrgyz from the southern regions through harsh nationalistic statements and stances, firm rejection of the provisional government's legitimacy, and refusal of foreign intervention (especially by the OSCE) in the country's inner affairs. It is led by Kashymbek Tashiev, Bakiyev's former minister of emergency situations, who became known after declaring that the Kyrgyz did not get the respect they deserve in their own state, and that Kyrgyzstan's ethnic minorities had to be culturally assimilated to prevent future ethnic unrest. 

The mayor of Osh, Melyzbek Myrzakmatov, among Bakiev's close followers, illustrates this strongly anti-government stance. Named by the former president, he successfully resisted attempts by the provisional government to have him to step down. He makes no mystery of his refusal to abide by Bishkek's rulings ("Provisional government directives have no legal force in the South"), and has launched an urban policy that some equate to ethnic cleansing. He has indeed announced the construction of collective housings in Osh's Uzbek districts that were destroyed in June, officially to house both Uzbek and Kyrgyz, but few doubt that only Kyrgyz will move in.

Roots of evil: the lingering heritage of the USSR's politics of nationalities.

Kyrgyzstan is a soviet-engineered country, that dates back to the early days of the USSR's politics of nationalities, at the time under the responsibility of the People's commissar for nationalities, Joseph Stalin. This policy advocated the creation of national republics along ethnic principles ("one people, on language, one territory"), though it had to be tempered so that the new republics could enjoy a minimum viability, hence the inclusion of parts of the Uzbek-populated Ferghana Valley into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In soviet times,  Moscow's control allowed ethnic conflicts between local Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Kyrgyz, and immigrants (whether Europeans or deported populations from the Caucasus or the Volga Basin) to remain frozen. However, the situation worsened after the implosion of the USRR. Relations between communities have since then gradually deteriorated.

Latent tensions that existed in Kyrgyzstan since the early 1990's brutally surfaced this summer. They first took the form of land occupation and property destructions, essentially at the expanse of ethnic minorities (Uzbeks and Meshketians Turks). Then, the bloody June riots in Osh, that heavily affected Uzbeks, shattered for good an already fragile inter-community trust, even though it is now likely that the riots were organized and that many Kyrgyz assisted and protected their Uzbek neighbours. Today, tensions result in occasional clashes and reciprocal mistrust. 

More intense in the South, anti-Uzbek feelings are particularly strong among the youth, which proved to be less influenced by calls to reconciliation. Additionaly, deep tensions continue to exist between Kyrgyz in the North and those in the South, traditionally poorer and kept away from power (except of course during the Bakiev era). The gap is today so deep that some even consider a partition of the country in two States regrouped in a federation. 

Towards the engulfment of the Ferghana Valley?

The October elections are a high risk vote. Numerous opposition parties indeed have youth sections that occasionaly serve as shock squads. If the result came to be contested, they could be used to spread disorder. This would certainly increase the Norsth-South gap, something that reminds us of the early days of the civil war in neighbouring Tajikistan. Furthermore, continuing persecutions against Uzbeks could result in some of them resorting to violence, whether by setting up paramilitary groups, or by turning to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan for assistance. The IMU would certainly accept, since a Kyrgyz sanctuary would be a key asset in its crusade to spread havoc in the entire Ferghana Valley. Furthermore, numerous Uzbek diasporas exist, including in Saudi Arabia, rich and influential enough to provide assistance regarding this domain.

One has to hope that calls to ethnic clash by nationalistic parties remain without widespread effect among the Kyrgyz, and/or that the fear of Moscow's reaction should the country fall into anarchy deter extremist elements to take active measures. The provisional government's call for amnesty of corrupted official (should they return the sums they took) provides a glimmer of hope for the upcoming post-elections period.