Silk road and "string of pearls": China's "Go West" strategy and its implications for eurasian transportation

The renewed attention for Central Asia following the opening of new logistical routes headed to Afghanistan and China's growing influence in the region has drawn attention on a potential re-opening of the legendary (though long forgotten) Silk Road. Indeed, numerous projects currently aim to develop road and railway networks for trade purposes. However, a massive shift of sea trade in favor of the so-called "Eurasian land bridge" is yet unlikely for diverse reasons.

Central Asia, a complex itinerary.

Numerous man-made factors today prevent thriving development of exchanges in Central Asia. On the one hand, the frequent boundary disputes between neighboring states in the region often result in border closings that hamper trade. On the other hand, default of harmonization of national transport regulations and the insistence of Central Asian States to develop transport networks on national rather than regional basis makes things even more complex. The resulting incertitude (transport costs and time often vary significantly), associated with other problems, seriously hampers development of trade in the region.

Even if most obstacles of political or regulatory origins were to be removed (which is today very unlikely), numerous physical factors would still impede large volumes of trade goods to be moved through the Eurasian land bridge. First of all, the difference in rail gauges between the former Soviet Union, China and Europe implies complex procedures at border check points (switching wheel-sets or moving the cargo on other wagons). In addition, Central Asia's road network, though currently used well under its maximum capacity, is not designed to support the intensive transport of heavy cargo. Furthermore, soviet-era transportation network was built to fit exchanges inside the USSR, not Eurasian trade (most of the lines follow a North-South orientation instead of a East-West one). Finally, the terrain and the climate are particularly harsh, especially when closing from the Indian subcontinent. High mountains make passage impossible, except in a few narrow passes, often blocked by avalanches, landslides and winter snowfalls.

Advantages of the sea route

Sea routes currently used are indeed more adapted than planned land routes when it comes to mass trade of cheap goods. Indeed, size limitations on the oceans are almost nonexistent, and it is possible for ships loaded with hundreds of containers to navigate around the world. Besides, these sea routes link between them important markets (East Asia, India, and the Persian Gulf in particular), far more lucrative than Central Asian markets currently limited in size, which makes sea travel much more profitable. Thus, a cargo ship can load hundreds of containers in China, unload some and load others in India before continuing to Europe.

China's policy in this domain seems to confirm the higher importance of sea routes. Beijing has indeed built a large network of alliances aiming to secure its main supply routes in the Indian Ocean. This expansion of Chinese influence is visible through construction of deep-water harbors in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan(Gwadar), able to host or support both trade ships and military vessels. Indeed, China's naval ambitions also translates into the recent development of its military fleet, with the ultimate goal (if Indian and American fears, China's principal competitors and most likely opponents, are to be confirmed) being to be able to operate far from continental China.

Conclusion

Developing in parallel sea and land routes to Europe and its energy suppliers (current or potential), China seeks to have as much alternatives as possible should a full-fledged conflict occur (especially with the United States, which still enjoy naval dominance). By building harbors and reinforcing its fleet, it seeks to protect sea routes linking it with the Persian Gulf, which still holds most of the world's energy reserves. However, it also secures  a land route used to reinforce its economic influence in Central Asia, and which could partially replace threatened sea routes. All the interest of the Eurasian corridor for China is that it is rather safe from disruption by its most-likely adversaries (the USA and India). Indeed, despite having some bases in Central Asia, it is unlikely that the US Army could wage a large scale conflict against China so far inland.

In the logistic and commercial domain, we can draw a parallel between the Eurasian Corridor and the Arctic road. Despite their potential, these routes cannot allow the transit of more than reduced volumes of goods. Thus, it is likely that existing and planned transport infrastructures, in the foreseeable future, will rather be used for bilateral trade between Central Asia and its neighbors. To some extent, transcontinental land transportation could allow for faster transport of valuable goods between China and Europe, providing an intermediary solution between sea (cheap but long) and air (fast but costly) shipping. This would somehow be the return of the Silk Road to its historical function: transcontinental shipping of high-value goods (spices, gems, silk, etc...).

Note: special thanks to Romain Leconte for his assistance regarding information on China's naval ambitions.