China's river grab on the "Roof of the World"

While Russia is being engulfed by wildfires, Asia has to struggle with massive flooding. Afghanistan, Pakistan and China are indeed hit, to various degrees, by destructive floods resulting from important rainfall. In China, these have been so important that the authorities had to open the Three Gorges dam (which was, quite ironically, constructed to prevent such floods on the Yangtze). In the wake of such extreme and unpredictable climate events, the Chinese government might be prompted to accelerate its dam construction projects.

Dams and hydro-power plants have numerous advantages for China. They make it possible to regulate the course of important rivers to prevent or reduce flooding, while producing China's much needed energy with few pollution or greenhouse gas emission. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has launched numerous construction projects, which already triggered conflicts with neighboring states. In particular, Chinese interference with the Mekong's natural course has angered southeastern Asian states and populations, deprived of the waters and fishes they need for their living. Recently, Chinese engineers started considering building a dam on the Brahmaputra river in Tibet, which is causing unrest in India and Bangladesh.

From black to blue gold: prospect for the development of hydraulic power in Central Asia

Central Asia's fossil fuel deposits were already known to attract Chinese attention, but less was known about the PRC's interests for the region's hydro-electric potential. China has indeed demonstrated its will to get involved in several projects in this domain, preferably where few or no Russian companies are present in order not to alienate Moscow.

Chinese eagerness to import hydro-generated electricity couldn't come better for the region's two main potential producers, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose situation is far from perfect. After the collapse of the USSR, newly-formed states couldn't agree on river management mechanisms, which led to lingering tensions and mistrust for the last 20 years. Furthermore, in spite of their hydroelectric potential, these States have to face widespread power shortages, particularly feared during the region's harsh winters. Besides, poorly maintained and insufficient power lines result in massive energy losses during transfers. The network's configuration, which dates back to the soviet period, also makes distribution harder since several cross-border power grids usually coexist on the territory of one single state. Also, the number of water-powered plants could be far greater than what is currently built. Finally, last but not least, the dams constructed during the soviet period were less oriented towards the production of electricity for the region than the provision of water for cotton cultivation in the lowlands crossed by the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya.

Towards an integration of Asian power grids?
 

In order to break the vicious circle and to become net power exporters, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have to modernize and develop their power grids, as well as to build new power plants. This requires funds that most international donors have so far refused to give, since most important projects were factors of tension with Uzbekistan, that feared new dams would endanger its water supply and lower its leverage on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. China, a neighboring country thirsty for energy, with huge amounts of money to invest and not deterred by the polemic nature of the projects, could not come better for those two States.

In Tajikistan, Chinese-backed projects are concentrated on the Zerafshan river. The Chinese Development Bank offered an important loan for the construction by SinHydro of a power plant in Yavan. In parallel, China has shown interest for the construction of a north-south high-voltage power line unifying Tajikistan's power grid and allowing future energy exports to neighboring countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Finally, China could also take part to the construction of the Rogun I & II power plants on the Vakhsh, which flows into the Amu-Darya.

Kyrgyzstan, at least until this year's civil unrest, was on China's top priority list. Indeed, a mere 10% of the country's potential is currently exploited, and it has already demonstrated willingness to collaborate with Beijing. China could thus invest large sums in the construction of the Kambarata I & II power plants on the Naryn (which flows into the Syr Darya) and of power lines stretching from Kyrgyzstan to China, and from then to Pakistan. In exchange, Kyrgyzstan would guarantee a steady power supply to China's far-western region of Sin Kiang. Finally, other options are being studied for building dams on rivers flowing from the Tian Shan mountains to China, which would besides reduce the cost of exploitation of mines located not far from there.

China is moving forward in Central Asia, in the energy sector as well as in other areas, progressively supplanting the Russian ally, who cannot compete with Beijing when it comes to economy. Increased Chinese presence could have positive consequences, should Beijing choose to buy power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in summer. This would allow these two countries to release waters to be used by Uzbekistan's agriculture, easing the tensions with the latter's, while accumulating hard currency to be later used to buy energy during winter. However, should China buy energy in winter, this would likely increase border tensions with Uzbekistan. And the way China has so far managed cross-border water issues does not encourage to think that Beijing will seek a consensus...

Map of the Central Asian power grid.

Credits: www.geni.org

Отпуск...

... or, for those not speaking Russian, I'm taking a one-month break, between Paris and Eurasia. Blogging is likely to be minimal these days and should resume normally by the end of July.

Unstability in Kirgyzstan : prelude to a civil war or mere riots?

The situation in South Kirghizstan is currently a source of concern to many. Troubles already left over 100 dead, about 1.500 wounded and triggered a mass exodus of ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan (official sources set the toll to about 80.000 displaced people, but unofficial sources released much higher figures ranging from 200.000 to 300.000). In order to quell the unrest, the Kirghiz provisional government has officially asked Russian troops to be deployed (somethning still refused by Moscow). However, should the government fail to stabilize the situation in the country, the issue of foreign intervention (and more especially of Russian military intervention) would come up again on the table.

Old hatreds, unusual unrest

Osh has been for some times the theatre of bloody ethnic riots mainly directed against the Uzbek population of the city. Many Uzbek already fled the country, while those still in the city barricaded so to avoid death by the hand of thugs, shunning any movement even to seek medical care or provisions. Several fires have reportedly been started by armed bands, which prevent firemen access to the sites.

It is today evident that the riots were started by elements linked to the criminal world, quite powerful in the area and taking advantage of political instability to settle scores. The assassination of an important crime boss, Aybek Mirsidikov (a.k.a "Black Aybek") is reported to have started the ongoing surge in criminal activity. However, it is thought that "external" forces are actually using criminal organizations as "contractors" to pursue their own goals. This reminds us of land property seizures that occurred following the ousting of president Bakiyev, some of them being carried out by fairly organized groups with violence. Today, it seems that the goal of those behind the resurgence in ethnic tensions and riots is to prevent the constitutional referendum planned later this month from taking place smoothly.

Tensions between Uzbek and Kyrgyz always existed in the Ferghana Valley, although they seldom triggered full fledged ethnic fighting (except in 1990), are deeply rooted. Several elements still fuel tensions between communities. First of all, alleged discrimination against the Uzbek in the administration, elected bodies and  regarding population statistics are regularly put forward. Also, numerous Uzbek businessmen complain about racket by corrupted officials from a mainly Kirghiz bureaucracy. Finally, the issue of land, already evoked in an earlier article, also plays its part.

The fightings also had consequences in matters not directly linked to security. Due to unrest, supply of essential goods and services to the city has been brought to a halt for several days already, which led to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation there as well as to scarcity of food and water. Outside of Osh, mass exodus of ethnic Uzbek in neighbouring Uzbekistan is putting an additional stress on the already crowed (and unstable) Ferghana Valley.

Attempts by the police to quell the unrest have so far proved unsuccessful, mainly because it lacks number and adequate equipment. In order to reverse the course of events and restore order, the provisional government initiated a partial mobilization of the army and sent additional police forces in the South. Additionally, it has called for Russian intervention in the country to support the government, while non governmental organization called for the UN to intervene militarily to halt the fightings.

Kyrgyz forces patrolling the streets of Osh

(Credits: REUTERS/lemonde.fr)

Are we headed towards a Russian direct involvement?

Neighbouring countries and influential powers with interests in the region have so far refused to get involved directly, rather sending medical and humanitarian assistance. While Russia and the CSTO have refused to send armed support, it is unlikely that the US and NATO will further stretch a military apparatus already to its limits with a stability operation in Southern Afghanistan proving more challenging than initially planned. The SCO, which gathered on the 11th of June in a summit in Tashkent, for its part made no sign that it was ready to commit itself actively.

However, direct foreign military intervention cannot be discarded, should the provisional government be unable to restore order. Indeed, many neighbouring states cannot permit unrest to settle in. Uzbekistan is both concerned with Islamic radicals (and especially IMO militants) taking refuge in this region and ethnic Uzbek refugees flooding in from Kirghiz Ferghana. Neither can the US and NATO countries engaged in Afghanistan allow such a situation to develop near supply lines vital to their campaign in Afghanistan. China, on its side, is not ready to accept a grey zone where Uigur Islamic militants could one day take refuge. Finally, Russia cannot allow this part of what is still its backyard slide into anarchy.

Being the heir to the defunct USSR, Russia remains the main security provider for the States of the region, a role it has so far defended against its Chinese "partner", with whom competition on the economic field is impossible. By refusing (or being unable) to rescue an ally requesting assistance would send a very negative signal and prompt other powers to take Russia's place in the area. China could seize the opportunity to become the new security provider, while Uzbekistan may chose to intervene in an attempt to stop the persecutions and the uncontrolled flow of refugees.

Thus, it appears that Russia has not formally discarded military intervention, while it reinforced its troops in the country. Moscow is however likely to shun as much as possible any further risky military operation, given its experiences in Chechnya and Afghanistan. It will rather wait for threats of direct involvement and tougher actions taken by the Kirghiz interim government to give effects before moving in, preferably with strong multilateral legitimation by CSTO or even SCO. Yet the prospect for such a scenario might well vanish, as reports of riots turning into mere looting of abandoned buildings and businesses started to come from Osh recently.

 Frontier guards of Uzbekistan helping ethnic Uzbek to flee Kyrgyzstan

(Credits: www.eurasianet.org)

Opium: "poison de rêve" and Russia's nightmare

As to answer NATO's ongoing offensive in Southern Afghanistan, an international forum dedicated to the issue of Afghan narcotics started in Moscow yesterday. A few days earlier, Russia's defence minister made clear the Kremlin's disappointment regarding what it considers as insufficient efforts by NATO forces to fight poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The question is of paramount importance to Russia, far more than to most NATO countries.

Narcotics in Central Asia; from local use to global trade

Climate in many regions of Central Asia and Afghanistan perfectly suits cultivation of crops such as hashish, poppy or ephedra, which serve as raw materials for several psycho-active substances. Logically, the locals quickly learned to use these plants for relaxation or medicinal purposes (one can think of the use made of opium as a painkiller in Joseph Kessel's Horsemen).

 Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and, to some extent, Central Asia (under soviet rule till recently) did not quickly increase before 1979 and the beginning of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. This growth is due to the conflict itself (the mujaheddin used opium as a source of income to fund their jihad) and to measures of interdiction taken in several countries (Turkey, Pakistan to some extent and Iran after the Islamic Revolution). Following the Soviet withdrawal and the expansion of the civil war, poppy cultivation further increased. Indeed, since US aid had stopped, warlords used drug trade to fund their militias, while peasants had found with opium a valuable crop in these troubled times. Finally, poppy does not require as much water as other crops to grow, and once harvested it can be kept some times; both things are important in a country where water and roads allowing fast travel to trade centres are scarce.

Genesis of a cancer

Before the arrival of Soviet troops  in Afghanistan, consumption of drugs was minimal in the USRR. However, combat stress experienced by soviet troops (most of them were reservists or draftees) led to a sharp increase in the consumption of narcotics, which created a demand inside USSR. This led to the development of drug rings involving Afghan producers and soviet smugglers, which outlived the end of the war and of the Soviet Union itself. After the collapse of the USSR, poor surveillance of the new borders and generalized impoverishment  created the conditions for large-scale drug trade to thrive. The civil war in Tajikistan further eased the development of continental smuggling rings (all parties resorted to drug trade to fund their struggle), especially due to the presence of ethnic Tajiks on both side of the Afghan-Tajik border and the widespread use of Russian as a lingua franca in former USSR. These rings still benefit from simple migration procedures between Russia and Tajikistan, as well as of the involvement of officials in drug trade (including veterans of the Tajik civil war now holding power seats). Finally, it appears that members of the Russian peacekeeping force in the country used military transports (not subject to controls) to smuggle drugs inside Russia, which prompted Moscow to tighten control over its soldiers abroad.

Because of Iran's bitter fight against drug trade, most of Afghan-made heroin now crosses Central Asia and Russia, whose borders are less tightly monitored. Complex boundaries, rampant corruption and diminishing volumes (smugglers now increasingly process poppy into heroin into Afghanistan rather than shipping raw materials outside of the country) make it harder for law enforcement units to intercept drug shipments. Eventually, transit areas become markets and Russia now has to cope with huge drug trade-related problems that impact its demography, endanger its future and fuel corruption. According to a UN paper, 30.000 Russians die every year because of heroin (one third of the 100.000 yearly toll of heroin addiction), while several millions (estimates range from 1,5 to 6 million people between 15 and 64) are heroin-addicted. Drug addiction also poses public health (HIV spreads through syringes exchanges) and socio-economic long-term problems (over-mortality of heroin-addicted youth, criminalization of the society, and economic weight of a significant population of addicts).

Roots of evil

Russia's growing concern and impatience are due to the importance of the drug trafficking problem and to its origins. Indeed, the take-off of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan occurred with the CIA's silent consent, while opium production kept on growing since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. Furthermore, the ISAF today concentrates on the fight against the insurgency, which draws profits from drug trade but is only one actor among others. Moscow especially reproaches NATO with renouncing poppy crops elimination because such policy would turn rural populations against ISAF forces. These prefer let the Afghan security forces deal with the problem, preferably by destroying labs and already processed heroin rather than burning crops. However, the Afghan National Police is plagued by corruption, and has so far not proved very efficient to tackle the problem

Moscow further denounced Washington's double standards on this issue ; while the US stress the importance not to alienate the population in Afghanistan, they long supported aggressive crops-elimination policies in Latin America, especially in Colombia. Russia also complained of poor cooperation between security forces in Afghanistan (regardless of their nationality) and Central Asian law enforcement agencies.

As a conclusion, it must be stressed that the Colombian experience in the field of counter-narcotics is worth a look and potentially interesting for upcoming operations in Afghanistan. This “Integral Action” doctrine emphasizes the need for coercion (elimination of illegal crops and dismantlement of illegal armed bands) and people-centred operations (population control and aid programs to promote alternative crops). The French armed forces' experience in Easter Afghanistan is also relevant in this domain.

Update (10.06.10): here is a potentially interesting article relased by ferghana.ru (in Russian) dedicated to drug trafficking through Kazakhstan. Let's also note that the subject of narcotics trade from Afghanistan will certainly be on the agenda of the SCO summit currently underway in Tashkent.

Tehran-Moscow axis: strategic partnership or simple "Entente Cordiale"?

The recent announcement of a Brazil-backed agreement between Turkey and Iran, regarding the latter's nuclear program has somehow driven attention away from the sharp deterioration of diplomatic relations between Russia and Iran. Judging by unfriendly official statements, the Russo-Iranian partnership did not survived Moscow's stauncher stance on the Iranian nuclear issue. Not limiting its reaction to mere words, Tehran has taken steps to improve its relationship with Georgia.

Russia's exasperation with Tehran is rooted in the latter's evident lack of goodwill on the nuclear issue. Indeed, Iran agreed to send its uranium abroad, only to withdraw its offer some days after and announce in parallel that it would proceed with enrichment to a higher degree, that was getting Tehran closer from mastering military nuclear process. Finally, active muscle-flexing from Tehran in the last months (war-games in the Gulf and repeated announcements about state-of-the-art weaponry entering service) did little to convince Moscow that Tehran's views are non-aggressive.

Moscow's concerns have been sensible for some time now. Over the past few months, Russia has been accused by Iran of delaying the entry into service of the nuclear plant in Bushehr (built by Rosatom) and of holding up the delivery of S-300 anti-aircraft systems.

Political U-turn or logical realignment?

One could assume that Moscow's new stance is the result of US concessions, of Medvedev's new attitude towards the West or simply of Russia's growing concern of Iran going nuclear. Whatever has triggered Moscow's change of attitude towards Iran, on thing is sure: given the numerous potential conflict points between Russia and Iran, their so-far rather good relationship was more a pragmatic alliance rather than a long-term strategic commitment.

Russia and Persia (whose Iran is somehow the heir) have a long story of rivalry and war, especially in the Caucasus (a fight that the Russians had largely won by the end of the XIXth century). Later on, Persia was placed in the spheres of influence of England and Russia (which was eventually replaced by the soviet union), and even occupied by Allied and Soviet forces during World War II. Finaly, the Islamic Revolution and its message of revolt to Muslims worldwide did not make Iran more friendly in the eyes of the Soviets, worried by the spread of sedition in their Muslim territories and already fighting an Islamic insurgency in neighbouring Afghanistan.

British caricature of the XIXth century, showing the Russian bear subjugating Persia.

Following the collapse of the USSR, Iran sought to break its encirclement by increasing its influence in countries of the former Soviet Union. This policy is still a reality, and Iran has been developing partnerships on various levels with several countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. It is no wonder then that Moscow sees with apprehension this intrusion of a new rival in what it still considers as its backyard. Especially when this rival has money (thanks to its soil's energy resources), and assets such as cultural, historical and linguistic proximity with these regions. Tensions are not limited to the Caucasus: indeed, Iran and Russia still have to agree on a legal status for the Caspian Sea, which would determine the way the seabed is shared.

Iran is fully aware of these dissensions with Russia. Hence, it has developed partnerships with China, a critical actor of the new "Great Game" and a relevant challenger to Russia influence in Central Asia. Iran today supplies China with part of the energy resources vital to its economic development, while China has already transferred sensitive military technologies to Iran (mainly in the field of ballistic, anti-ship and anti-air missiles).

From rivalry to conflict?

Despite real tensions between the two countries, it is unlikely that either of the two will push the confrontation to a superior level, whether this takes the form of direct armed conflict or proxy-wars. First of all, both Tehran and Moscow have common interest (the first of them being chasing NATO from Central Asia) and important contracts in the military and nuclear sector underway. But both States are also mutually deterred from taking too harsh measures against one another by what equates to a balance of terror.

Iran could, if needed, seriously destabilize the Caucasus, and particularly Russian-controlled parts of the region. The Pasdarans (Islamic Revolution Guard Corps) have accumulated extensive experience in the field of irregular warfare through support for Hezbollah, today one of the most proficient guerilla movements in the world. Indeed, Hezbollah's "know-how" in fields such as ambush tactics, handling of antitank weapons , assembly of IEDs and construction of underground shelters and bunkers could easily be used by Caucasian insurgents evolving in a mountainous environment suitable for guerilla tactics.

Such a move from Iran is however unlikely, given the fact that Russia would, in these event, retain tremendous retaliation capabilities on Iranian assets. And the way Mikhail Saakachvili's 2008 military adventure ended says more than a long speech on Moscow's determination not to let unpunished this kind of provocation...

 

Winds of change in Uzbekistan?

The most populous state in Central Asia, Uzbekistan today finds itself in an uncomfortable position. Shaken by the world economic crisis, unable to rely on oil and gas exports to replenish its foreign currency reserves, it is furthermore threatened by instability in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and numerous internal problems.

« It's the economy, stupid »

One could believe that Uzbekistan is doing quite well; it has indeed secured a 1,150 billion USD loan from the Asian Development Bank, the same amount it has so far lent to Uzbekistan from 1996. However, though all this fresh money will certainly relieve a strained budget, it was not without painful concessions from Uzbekistan, which could further provoke discontent among the population. Besides, indicators show that the economy is not doing well, and so on for Uzbekistan's budget.

In the past months, the Uzbek government seems to have taken several measures aimed at raising more funds: it has cut expenses on invalidity pensions, risen taxes on fuel and cars,  and lowered interest rates for private deposits in state-owned banks. This has occurred in parallel with an accelerated devaluation of the national currency (sum), whose « official » price is more and more overvalued regarding the sum/dollar parity on the black market. This most likely means that Uzbekistan is short on foreign currency reserves and unable to support the sum.

The fact the Uzbek government is obviously short on funds might prompt hasty explanations for some of last months' most unpleasant events. For example, widespread arrests of businessmen and oligarchs in march 2010 resulted in rumours that this was simply a way to refill the State's coffers. The same could be stated about the problems currently experienced by Zeromax, Uzbekistan largest private company and reportedly in the hands of President Karimov's daughter and ambassador to Spain, Gulnara (altough such pursuits are more likely politically, and not economically motivated). Finally, the loss by hundreds of their savings in the National Bank of Uzbekistan could eventually prompt rumours that the State is now robbing its own citizens in order to restore balance in its budget.

Growing discontent

The bad and so far deteriorating economic situation plays a big part in the growing exasperation of the population. Hardly hit by the crisis, heavy taxes, political repression and environmental problems, Uzbeks also had to cope, in the last months, with unpaid wages, looming food shortages, as well as more « usual » hardness for the region (power cuts, and poor healthcare quality sometimes resulting in contamination). Furthermore, rumours recently grew that Uzbek authorities had initiated a forced sterilization campaign in order to curb overcrowding in the region. All this does little to appease griefs against the Uzbek government, which has grown increasingly anxious over the past months that unrest in Kyrgyzstan might spread to Uzbek parts of the Ferghana Valley. Indeed, in 2005, an uprising in Andijan closely followed the Kyrgyz tulip revolution. Although its bloody crushing has so far deterred any new protest in Uzbekistan, Uzbek authorities are afraid that the troubles shaking southern Kyrgyzstan could provide opportunities for troublemakers at home.

Musical chairs in Madrid and Tashkent?

Zeromax's current problems should not be separated from the bigger picture of Uzbek politics. Gulnara Karimova, President Karimov's daughter, has long been considered as a possible heir to her father. However, recent developments suggest it might after all not be the case. Indeed, Gulnara is said to be a controversial figure and would thus not make a consensual leader when the time comes to succeed the father. Most important perhaps, she remains a women, and most likely unable to hold power for long in a rather conservative and patriarchal society.

Whether Gulnara Karimova is being forces out of succession or willingly accepting to stay out of politics has no great interest for today. Rather, it would be interesting to know whether or not President Islam Karimov has supported this evolution. Indeed, the worsening situation of the countries and the subsequent fears it could be destabilized may have emboldened some rival clans in Uzbek politics. The recent troubles experienced by Zeromax would thus be the sign of Karimov's diminishing control over the Uzbek state apparatus.

Feeding the Bear: soviet military logistics in Afghanistan

Scene from the motion picture "9th Company" (9 Рота)

Though Afghanistan has been invaded many times, it has yet never been totally conquered since a foreign invasion force can hardly maintain itself in the country. This is mainly due to harsh climate, terrain and poor communication infrastructure, resulting in a logistical nightmare such as the one experienced by the Soviet Union between 1979 and 1989. In order to face unexpected challenges, Soviet logistics adapted itself to Afghanistan, as did the whole 40th army.

Soviet logistic organizational structure: limits and evolutions

It became clear since the very beginning of the conflict that soviet supply structures, designed for a large-scale conflict against NATO or China was not adapted to a low-intensity conflict involving a smaller number of forces that would-be World War III. In particular, the pyramidal organization intended to give good theatre-level reactivity proved inadequate because it failed to provide good tactical flexibility. Order and supply invariably had to travel the whole command and hierarchical chain, which demanded a lot of time.

Other elements plagued soviet logistics. Among other things, many units deployed initially did not carry with them enough supply and spare parts for this type of conflict, and transport priorities did not match real supply needs (missiles and ammunitions rather than food, medical and fuel supplies, were shipped as soon as possible).

Alleviating and protecting the roads

In the beginning, the Soviets did not plan to stay long, and they organized most supply operations from facilities in the USSR without building any significant one in Afghanistan. However, when the Red Army realized that it was here to stay, it build several important supply depots (in Herat and Pol-e-Kormi) and maintenance facilities (in Herat and Jalalabad) to relieve those in Kabul. Other less important facilities and pipelines were built along the main roads to ease traffic, routine maintenance and driver support.

Map of Afghanistan's road network and main soviet bases.

Credits: Army magazine, January 1988.

Finally, in order to protect this network, the Red Army built numerous bases protected by fortifications, minefields, and garrisoned with troops and artillery. This was however not enough to provide full security, hence the need for convoy escort and road patrols.

Mobile convoy protection elements

Defence of logistical fluxes was indispensable (ambushes often resulted into loss of hardware, sometimes do the mujahiddins, and roads closing for several hours) and required many troops that could not be employed in offensive operations. It must be noted that soviet logistics had to supply the expeditionary force (110.000 men), the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's (DRA) armed forces and part of the civilian population, which dramatically increased stress on transportation capabilities.

Units patrolled the roads night and day, searching for mujahideens, mines and roadblocks, or simply road sections suitable for ambushes. Furthermore, ahead of every convoy was a "movement support detachment" tasked to repair the roads and clear it from obstacle and mines (mostly with sniffer-dogs and hand-held detectors, since the terrain did not allow the deployment of mine-removing vehicles). Despite these precautions, the convoys were still frequently attacked, hence the necessity for them to have good self-defence capabilities (especially given that rescue units rushing to the ambush sites were themselves frequently ambushed on the way).

Because of the risks, convoys only moved by day, advancing not faster than the movement support detachment ahead (which explains the length of the trips). Survival chances of a convoy being proportional to its size, the Soviets organized columns of several hundreds of vehicles stretching on large distances, protected by escorts in the head, middle and end. However, Afghan roads being narrow, these escorts could hardly move from one  part of the convoy to another, making protection difficult. Furthermore, the great number of bottlenecks made it easy for mujahideens to block vital roads by blowing vehicles that would become wreckages not removed before hours. This vulnerability was particularly illustrated by the 1982 Salang tunnel disaster, when a collision triggered a fire in the tunnel which resulted in numerous casualties and the closure of the vital road from Termez to Kabul.

Soviet logistics in combat

As supply convoys became a priority target for insurgents, the Soviet military had to strengthen this component of its military apparatus. Traditionally, Red Army supply units were made of conscripts and reservists, whose two-year term did not permit adequate training. As a result, these units at first poorly performed in combat or in driving heavy Kamaz trucks (less manoeuvrable that regular ones but better adapted to the poor quality of Afghanistan's roads). As the supply units became more professional, it became clear that they had to master more combat-oriented skills, like shooting from a moving vehicle with assault rifles or vehicle mounted guns (especially the ZU-23 AA gun, which proved adequate to target insurgents shooting from high grounds).

Ongoing attacks made the task of drivers, engineers and pipeline troops (aka trubashis) very difficult and in many occasions they had to perform their duties under fire. It is then no surprise that these units acquired real prestige during the war in Afghanistan, and that medals awarded achievements earned in this "Highway war".

The role of air support

Saturation of ground supply roads led the Red Army to rely more intensively on aircraft to transport hardware to Afghanistan, supply isolated or besieged garrisons and evacuate the wounded. Despite its capabilities reduced by 25% due to the climate and the altitude, the helicopter became a symbol of the Soviet-Afghan war. Transport helicopters like the Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-26 became the workhorses of airborne logistics, while the Mi-24 attack gunship was extensively used for close air support and convoy escort tasks (though in this last case, its rotors were vulnerable to enemy fire coming from the high grounds).